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PASSIVE TAKINGS:
THE STATE’S AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
TO PROTECT PROPERTY
Christopher Serkin*
The purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is to protect property
owners from the most significant costs of legal transitions. Paradigmatically, a
regulatory taking involves a government action that interferes with expecta-
tions about the content of property rights. Legal change has therefore always
been central to regulatory takings claims. This Article argues that it does not
need to be and that governments can violate the Takings Clause by failing to
act in the face of a changing world. This argument represents much more than
a minor refinement of takings law because recognizing governmental liability
for failing to act means that, in at least some circumstances, the Constitution
compels the government to protect property. Such liability runs counter to
conventional understandings of constitutional law in which the Constitution
primarily enshrines negative liberties. And yet this liability follows surpris-
ingly naturally from leading takings and property theory. The Takings Clause,
then, can serve as a previously unrecognized basis for affirmative governmen-
tal obligations. The Article ultimately illustrates this new category of passive
takings with the example of sea-level rise, arguing that ecological threats may
compel the government either to respond or pay compensation for the damages
resulting from this ecological change.
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
I. The Takings Clause and Legal Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
A. The Takings Clause and the Protection of Expectations . . . . . 349
B. Legal Stasis and Ecological Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
C. The Constitution and Affirmative Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
II. Takings Theory and Affirmative Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
A. Utilitarian Takings Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
B. Fairness-Based Takings Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
C. Property Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
III. Passive Takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Eric Biber, Peter Byrne, Nestor
Davidson, John Echeverria, Lee Fennell, Tim Mulvaney, J.B. Ruhl, Joe Singer, Kevin Stack,
Michael Vandenbergh, and participants at the 2013 Association for Law, Property and Society
Conference for their comments and input. The piece also benefited tremendously from early
conversations with Lisa Bressman, Mike Cahill, Brian Lee, Tom Merrill, and Nelson Tebbe.
Thanks to the Brooklyn Law School Dean’s Summer Research Stipend and the Vanderbilt Law
School summer research fund for supporting this project. Emily Anderson provided invaluable
research assistance.
345
346 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:345
A. The Act/Omission Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
B. Passive Takings Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
C. Limitations and Counterarguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
1. Infringing Authority over Priorities—Invading
“Prosecutorial Discretion” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
2. Moral Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
3. Inducing Inaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
IV. Examples of Passive Takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
A. Passive Takings from Sea-Level Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
1. Height Limits on Beachfront Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
2. Armoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
B. Evaluating Passive Takings in the Context of Sea-Level
Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
C. Other Contexts for Passive Takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
Introduction
Conventionally understood, regulatory takings doctrine protects prop-
erty owners from significant, adverse changes in the law. The paradigmatic
example of a regulatory taking involves a new regulation—environmental
protection, zoning limit, and so forth—that interferes with owners’ settled
and reasonable expectations. In formal terms, the Takings Clause1 provides
at least occasional relief from the costs and consequences of legal transi-
tions.2 But what about regulatory inaction? Can the government’s failure to
regulate, or its failure to act to protect private property, ever amount to an
unconstitutional taking? This Article argues that it can.
The claim should appear quite startling. The Constitution is typically
thought to create only negative rights—rights that constrain the government
from acting in certain proscribed ways.3 Takings liability for regulatory inac-
tion—what this Article calls passive takings—means that property owners
could be constitutionally entitled either to governmental intervention on
their behalf or to compensation if the government fails to act. This Article
1. U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”).
2. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1, 11 (2003)
(“Regulatory takings claims are all about change. They are obviously about distribution of the
costs of regulatory transitions between landowners and society.”); see also Abraham Bell, Not
Just Compensation, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 29, 33 (2003); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 569 (1984);
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 532 n.61
(1986).
3. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 330, 330 (1985) (arguing
that constitutional rights are commonly understood “to impose on government only a duty to
refrain from certain injurious actions, rather than an affirmative obligation to direct energy or
resources to meet another’s needs”).
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ultimately illustrates the new category of passive takings through the exam-
ple of sea-level rise, but the concept potentially applies to property more
broadly, in settings as diverse as copyright law and financial regulation.4
While the idea of imposing affirmative constitutional duties on the state
is unorthodox as a matter of general constitutional law, it is surprisingly
consonant with underlying justifications for the Takings Clause. For exam-
ple, from a consequentialist perspective focused on regulatory incentives, the
Takings Clause is supposed to induce efficient regulatory activity by forcing
the government to internalize the costs of its actions.5 But holding the gov-
ernment liable only for its affirmative actions can distort governmental deci-
sionmaking. In some contexts, governmental inaction is the most costly
choice of all. Where that is true, forcing the government to pay for its regu-
latory actions but not its omissions will have the perverse effect of deterring
the government from doing anything at all, even if a regulatory response
could dramatically increase overall societal well-being. Similarly, distributive
theories of property concerned with the fair or just allocation of burdens
and benefits in society view the Takings Clause as preventing disproportion-
ate regulatory burdens.6 But burdens can be unfairly distributed in society
through governmental inaction as well. Passive takings liability requires ex-
amining the extent of the government’s complicity in distributional out-
comes rather than focusing exclusively on the categorical but ultimately
porous distinctions between regulatory acts and omissions.
Existing takings law and theory extend with surprising ease to reach
previously unrecognized passive takings claims, but this new category then
requires fundamentally reconceptualizing the nature of constitutional pro-
tection for private property. It means that constitutional protection is not
merely negative—not merely a restriction on governmental action—but can
create affirmative duties for the government to respond to changing condi-
tions in the world. This is not freestanding liability; the government is not
an insurer of last resort whenever property is threatened. But such liability
does arise whenever the government is so entangled in the substantive con-
tent of property that the line between acts and omissions becomes especially
blurry—for example, in cases where the government has acted to disable
property owners’ self-help.7
Indeed, there are contexts in which no principled basis exists for distin-
guishing between regulatory acts and omissions. In tort law, theorists have
famously contrasted a passerby who fails to throw a rope to a drowning man
with a driver who fails to avoid someone in the road.8 While both involve
4. See infra Section IV.C (discussing these examples).
5. See Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 84–85 (1993); Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 73–74 (8th ed. 2011); Frederic Bloom & Christopher
Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 576 (2012) (describing the conventional eco-
nomic account of the Takings Clause).
6. See infra Section II.B (discussing fairness-based conceptions of the Takings Clause).
7. See infra Section III.B (discussing passive takings test).
8. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J. 247, 253
(1980); see also infra text accompanying notes 130–135 (discussing this and other examples).
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inaction, there is a critical difference: the driver, by getting into the car, has
created the conditions giving rise to the ultimate injury. Analogously, by
exerting substantial control over property, the government sometimes as-
sumes the role of the driver who has a duty to hit the brakes when a pedes-
trian appears in the road. Although regulations may be perfectly
constitutional when enacted, they can trigger a duty for the government to
respond to changes in the world. At least when it comes to property, then,
the Constitution—through the Takings Clause—will sometimes compel
governmental action. What initially appears to be a small lacuna in takings
doctrine therefore amounts to much more.
Sea-level rise provides an important real-world illustration of the poten-
tial payoff of this Article’s central normative claim. Some governments—
both state and local—are failing to take aggressive steps to address the risks
of sea-level rise at least partly because they worry that regulatory responses
might trigger takings liability.9 Establishing new setbacks from the ocean or
prohibiting sea walls, for example, implicate traditional takings analysis, and
the threat of takings liability may well be discouraging some governments
from adopting these and other measures that could minimize the impacts of
rising seas.10 But allowing governments to escape liability so easily seems
strange when coastal property is already subject to comprehensive and over-
lapping land-use and environmental regulations. Preexisting regulatory in-
tervention means that the government should not be able to wash its hands
of responsibility now. In fact, immunizing the government from the conse-
quences of inaction actually discourages action. The category of passive tak-
ings therefore creates an important counterbalance to the threat of
traditional takings liability and encourages governments to reduce the over-
all costs of sea-level rise.
Part I describes the conventional view that takings liability applies only
to moments of legal change. It then argues that such liability can also arise
from changes in the world, even during times of legal stability. Part I also
9. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Coastal Climate Resilience: Urban
Waterfront Adaptive Strategies 72 (2013) (“Regulations that sharply limit the economic
use of properties can trigger takings challenges. Because of all these factors, strategic retreat
should be pursued only as part of a well-considered plan for a community in an urban area.”).
10. See, e.g., James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1279 (1998)
(discussing application of Takings Clause to responses to sea-level rise); see also Robert
Meltz, Cong. Research Serv., R42613, Climate Change and Existing Law: A Survey of
Legal Issues Past, Present, and Future (2012); Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day
at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34
Ecology L.Q. 533, 567 (2007) (discussing takings implications of rolling easements); Megan
M. Herzog & Sean B. Hecht, Combatting Sea-Level Rise in Southern California: How Local
Governments Can Seize Adaptation Opportunities While Minimizing Legal Risk, 19 Hastings
W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 463, 479–82 (2013) (discussing takings impact of adaptation
strategies); Travis Martay Brennan, Comment, Redefining the American Coastline: Can the Gov-
ernment Withdraw Basic Services from the Coast and Avoid Takings Claims?, 14 Ocean &
Coastal L.J. 101 (2008) (discussing takings impact of withdrawing governmental support for
coastal property owners).
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discusses the conventional understanding of affirmative constitutional obli-
gations, arguing that the status of property rights in the Constitution makes
passive takings claims surprisingly feasible, both doctrinally and politically.
Part II turns to underlying takings doctrine and property theory, arguing
that efficiency and fairness concerns, as well as normative property theory,
support extending takings liability to passive takings. Part III then sets out
the proposed doctrine of passive takings in more detail, defining the specific
contexts in which passive takings claims may arise and addressing several of
the strongest counterarguments. Finally, Part IV puts the theory to the test,
applying the category of passive takings to the problem of sea-level rise and
speculating about additional contexts in which passive takings claims might
arise.
I. The Takings Clause and Legal Transitions
Courts and commentators frequently assert—and even more frequently
assume—that the Takings Clause is implicated only when the government
changes the law.11 The compensation requirement for regulatory takings
serves to protect property owners from the effects of legal transitions by
compensating them for regulatory interference with their reasonable expec-
tations.12 This Part explores those assumptions and then sets up the doctri-
nal problem of creating liability for regulatory inaction. The balance of the
Article defines and defends this category of passive takings.
A. The Takings Clause and the Protection of Expectations
The Takings Clause protects property from regulatory burdens that
“go[ ] too far.”13 The nature and extent of that protection remain fiercely
contested. Difficult conceptual and doctrinal problems have bedeviled courts
and commentators for decades, and the controversies need no rehearsal
11. See, e.g., Meltz, supra note 10, at 23 (“Generally, failure to act cannot be the basis of
a taking claim.”); J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and
Time, 73 La. L. Rev. 69, 91 (2012) (“Government cannot take property purely by inaction.”);
Doremus, supra note 2, at 11 (“Regulatory takings claims are all about change. They are obvi-
ously about distribution of the costs of regulatory transitions between landowners and soci-
ety.”); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 522 (“Appeals to reliance on preexisting law and expectations
concerning legal change have traditionally formed the basis for assessing the transition prob-
lem.”); see also Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation”
Be Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 451, 491 (2003)
(assuming legal or regulatory change); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations,
and Legal Progress, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 211, 211–12 (2003) (focusing on legal
change). This is distinct from the literature on eminent domain, which is not relevant to the
argument in this Article.
12. Leading literature on legal transitions includes Daniel Shaviro, When Rules
Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity
(2000) (discussing changes to tax rules); Kaplow, supra note 2; Saul Levmore, Changes, Antici-
pations, and Reparations, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1657 (1999); and Logue, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922) (setting out the “goes
[-]too[-]far” test).
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here.14 But the core cases and the broad outlines of regulatory takings doc-
trine all involve protecting property owners’ expectations—expectations
often reflected in existing uses of property.15
The polestar for regulatory takings liability remains Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City.16 There, the Supreme Court articulated a
three-part ad hoc balancing test, focusing on the character of the regulation,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with property owners’ invest-
ment-backed expectations, and the resulting diminution in value.17 Together,
these factors ask whether—and to what extent—a governmental action or
regulation has interfered with owners’ reasonable and settled expectations
surrounding the use of their property.
Imagine, for example, that someone bought beachfront property expect-
ing to build a single-family home, a permitted use at the time of the
purchase. If the government subsequently changes its setback rules, making
it impossible to build on the lot, the property owner may have a takings
claim. The legal issues will include whether the property owner’s expecta-
tions of building a single-family home were reasonable and, perhaps,
whether they were sufficiently investment backed.18 If the answer to these
questions is yes, the success of the takings claim will then depend on the
extent of the government’s interference with those expectations. A regula-
tion that only partially interferes—that requires the owner to build a slightly
smaller house, for example, or to build a house a bit farther from the
water—is almost certainly not a taking. But if the interference is more sub-
stantial, it may trigger takings liability.19
Takings claims therefore fundamentally depend on the divergence be-
tween an owner’s expectations and what the law will allow. If an owner
14. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regu-
latory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 741 (2005) (“Looking for consistency in takings cases is
a little bit like finding shapes in the clouds: you can see them if you look hard enough, but
they say more about the observer than the clouds themselves.”).
15. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1222, 1229 (2009) (describing but criticizing takings protection for existing
uses of property).
16. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
17. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. For a discussion of the test and its operation, see, for
example, David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 121–68 (2002) (dis-
cussing vagueness of factors) and Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed,
34 Ecology L.Q. 307, 329–30 (2007) (discussing factors).
18. In Penn Central, the Court referred to “distinct investment-backed expectations.” 438
U.S. at 124. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), the Court restated this
Penn Central factor as “reasonable investment[-]backed expectations.” While the Court did
not acknowledge the change, it has not been lost on commentators. See Steven J. Eagle, The
Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 533, 560 (2002).
19. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
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reasonably expects to put property to a use worth $100, and a new regula-
tion permits a use worth only $15, the government may well have to com-
pensate the owner or withdraw the regulation (or both).20
This stylized example makes it obvious enough why the Takings Clause
is traditionally thought to apply only in the face of legal change. If the set-
back lines were established before a buyer bought the property, or if other
preexisting regulations made the parcel impossible or inordinately difficult
to develop, those extant regulations at least temper the buyer’s expecta-
tions.21 If someone buys property in a neighborhood zoned single-family
residential, she cannot complain when she is prevented from developing the
property as a gas station, an adult theater, an apartment building, or for
another more intensive use.
Expectations inconsistent with existing law are not automatically unrea-
sonable, however, because the relationship between an owner’s expectations
and the regulatory environment is complex and contested.22 Indeed, some
takings claims may survive the transfer of property. If a government enacts a
regulation that amounts to an unconstitutional taking but the owner sells
the property before pursuing the claim, the new owner may be able to stand
in the shoes of the previous owner to bring a takings claim against the gov-
ernment. As the Supreme Court decided in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,23 the
mere fact that a regulation predates the owner’s acquisition of the property
does not automatically make all inconsistent expectations “unreasonable.”
In some circumstances, property owners may have a reasonable expectation
that the applicable regulations will change, either because the possibility is
already in the air or because the buyer reasonably expected to be able to
20. For a discussion of the problem of remedy and compensation in regulatory takings,
see, for example, Serkin, supra note 14. See also John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The
Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 Vt. L. Rev.
695, 706–09 (1993) (discussing remedies for regulatory takings).
21. See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News &
Analysis 10,471, 10,476 (2009) (“Takings claims brought by purchasers with notice continue
to be rejected on a fairly routine basis.”); see also Carol Necole Brown, Taking the Takings
Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of Takings Claims After Property Transfers,
36 Conn. L. Rev. 7, 12 (2003) (“[C]ourts have rejected Penn Central takings challenges by
finding that the property owner’s notice of pre-existing regulations divests the owner of any
reasonable investment-backed expectation to use the property in a manner prohibited by the
regulation.”).
22. See, e.g., J. David Breemer & R.S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-
Backed Expectations After Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts’ Disturbing Insistence on Wallowing
in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. L. Rev. 351, 394 (2005) (“If an owner indeed acquires the
property rights of pre-regulation predecessors, then his expectations are coterminous with a
pre-regulation predecessor. Since the pre-regulation owner would have a reasonable expecta-
tion of building free of the regulation, so would the newer owner.”); see also R.S. Radford & J.
David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine
of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 449,
483–95 (2001) (discussing cases).
23. 533 U.S. 606, 626–27 (2001) (refusing to “put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the
Lockean bundle” of property rights and allowing property owner to challenge preexisting wet-
lands regulation under Penn Central).
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contest them successfully.24 A property owner’s expectations are therefore
not necessarily unreasonable simply because they are inconsistent with ex-
isting regulations.
Nevertheless, takings claims have always been thought to involve some
legal transition that interfered with a property owner’s (or her predeces-
sor’s) settled expectations—expectations that were constituted, at least in
part, by the content of background regulations and the common law of
property. While the legal change may have occurred before the current
owner bought the property, legal change is nevertheless at the heart of tradi-
tional takings claims.
B. Legal Stasis and Ecological Transitions
Governmental interference with settled expectations does not, however,
depend on the government’s changing the law. A stable legal rule combined
with a change in the world—an “ecological change”—can interfere with
owners’ expectations just as much as an explicit legal transition. For pur-
poses of this Article, ecological changes are not limited to environmental
changes in the narrow sense but can refer instead to any changes in condi-
tions in the world. Nevertheless, the pressing environmental threat of sea-
level rise provides the clearest real-world example.
To foreshadow the detailed analysis in Part IV, a number of states have
long-standing rules prohibiting beachfront (littoral) owners from building
any impermeable barriers (e.g., breakwaters, sea walls, revetments, and so
forth) to the seaward side of the vegetation line.25 Those rules—some of
which have been in place since at least the 1970s—were often enacted to
maintain the attractiveness of the shore and public access to beaches.26 The
prohibition on such barriers has always subjected beachfront property own-
ers to some risk of erosion, but the threat to property was, in general, rela-
tively modest. In the ordinary course, these restrictions would not have had
a significant impact on property values and almost certainly would not have
24. Cf. Bell, supra note 2, at 47 (“In every case, the likelihood of a taking enters the
market at some point, and at that point, the value of the property in the market changes to
reflect the new information.”); Serkin, supra note 15, at 1283 (discussing effect of property
owners’ ability to anticipate legal changes).
25. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-290 (2008 & Supp. 2013) (prohibiting all new
armoring “seaward of the baseline,” subject to minor exceptions); see also Todd T. Cardiff,
Comment, Conflict in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 255,
256 (2001) (“In 1976, when the California legislature passed the Coastal Act, the legislature
was aware of the adverse impacts of seawalls” and prohibited development that would require
constructing protective devices).
26. See Cardiff, supra note 25, at 256 (“Shoreline armoring only benefits the incredibly
small minority of the population that owns property directly on the coast, while it decreases
access to the millions of people who flock to the beach every year.”); cf. Jessica Grannis,
Adaptation Tool Kit: Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Land Use 38 tbl.10 (2011) (listing as a
disadvantage that “[a]rmoring can also obstruct public access to the coast”); N.Y. State Sea
Level Rise Taskforce, Report to the Legislature 7 (2010) (“As water levels rise, sea walls,
dikes and similar structures along the state’s coastline may limit public access to beaches as the
publicly accessible intertidal zone is eliminated.”).
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risen to the level of a taking at the time they were adopted. In fact, each
beachfront property owner may well have benefited from the reciprocal re-
strictions on every other beachfront owner, restrictions that likely kept the
beach more valuable for all.
Sea-level rise threatens that calculus. What had been a relatively innocu-
ous prohibition on sea walls suddenly imposes a very different kind of hard-
ship. Unable to “armor” their property, beachfront owners could well lose
their homes to increased storm surge and, indeed, even lose their property
altogether through erosion and eventual inundation.27
In this example, the law has not changed. The prohibition on physical
barriers remained consistent. Ecological change, however, makes that same
stable rule apply very differently, and such change indeed may threaten a
total wipeout of the property.28 If the government were to adopt that regula-
tory prohibition today—or, say, fifty years in the future, when the effects of
sea-level rise are even more definite—the prohibition could very well
amount to an unconstitutional taking. The fact that the law happened to
have been on the books already, at a time when its impact was innocuous,
does not make the application of the law to the changed conditions in the
world any less burdensome.
The general phenomenon is simply this: a regulation that is not a taking
when enacted begins to work a severe hardship because of changes in the
world. The regulated entity or property owner comes to experience the regu-
latory burden as a significant impairment of expectations. Even though the
regulation itself has not changed, its application to the changed conditions
in the world imposes new burdens. In those situations, if the hardship is
severe enough, a property owner has a doctrinally plausible takings claim
despite—and indeed because of—the fact that the law has not changed.
Viewed in these general terms, this phenomenon could manifest itself in
any number of scenarios in which a regulation was benign at the time it was
adopted but comes to impose a significant, unexpected, and constitutionally
problematic burden because of technological or ecological changes. Imagine,
for example, land zoned exclusively for single-family use that becomes envi-
ronmentally contaminated and therefore suitable only for industrial use. Or
27. Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Adaptation Law, in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law
677, 696 (Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. 2014) (“Littoral property owners
have been battling the oceans with seawalls, riprap, and bulkheads for centuries, and there is
no reason to think they won’t give sea-level rise a fight as well.”). See generally Matthew
Heberger et al., The Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on the California Coast (2009)
(describing effects of sea-level rise).
28. Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030–31 (1992) (discussing the
standard for a “total taking” when setback requirements prevented any development on beach-
front lots). For an insightful treatment of the dynamic changes triggered by climate change
specifically, see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62
Duke L.J. 975, 975–81, 991 (2013) (“ ‘[The] idea that natural systems fluctuate within an
unchanging envelope of variability’ is known in the resource- and infrastructure-management
disciplines as the ‘stationarity assumption.’ ” (quoting P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationary Is Dead:
Whither Water Management?, 319 Science 573, 573 (2008))).
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imagine a fifty-foot setback requirement that makes it impossible to build
on a property after the path of a river changes.
While this observation may seem entirely straightforward, it actually
suggests something quite profound. It means that, in some circumstances,
the government’s failure to change the law could trigger takings liability. Or,
to put it even more dramatically, the government can violate the Constitu-
tion by failing to take affirmative steps to change preexisting law or by failing
to protect property from the application of preexisting law. And that is pre-
cisely what the balance of this Article argues: the government’s relationship
to property sometimes creates affirmative duties, and property owners are
entitled either to summon the regulatory power of the state to act on their
behalf or alternatively to receive compensation for the government’s failure
to act or protect their property.
Some might object to this doctrinal setup, however. First, they might
argue that it is the change in the world, not the government’s regulation,
that is interfering with property owners’ expectations. Under this view, the
various changes should not create cognizable takings claims at all. Property
owners, not the government, should bear the risk of ecological change. In
this account, the government is responsible only for establishing the back-
ground rules. Any bets that property owners decide to make—whether sea
walls will remain unnecessary, for example—should not trigger liability for
the government.29
While the government should not usually bear the risks of ecological
changes, preexisting regulations do not entirely determine owners’ reasona-
ble expectations. The argument is closely analogous to the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Palazzolo. As the Court famously ruled in that case, “Just as a
prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value
of land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable
by all concerned, other enactments are unreasonable and do not become less
so through passage of time or title.”30 Of course, the Court there was refer-
ring to regulations that were unreasonable when enacted and that did not
subsequently become reasonable over time. But the same basic principle ap-
plies here. Expectations are informed by positive law, but regulations that
apply unreasonably to property rights are not immune from constitutional
challenge simply because they predate the acquisition of property or the
owner’s formation of his expectations.31 Ultimately, the persuasiveness of
this response depends on deeper normative claims about the state’s obliga-
tions—claims explored later in this Article.32 For now it suffices to recognize
29. Another formulation of this concern is that the government should not become the
insurer of last resort against changes in the world. The doctrinal limits of passive takings
liability minimize this overarching concern. See infra Section III.B (discussing the outlines of
passive takings claims).
30. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
31. For a further discussion, see supra note 22.
32. See infra Section I.C, Part II, Section IV.B.
December 2014] Passive Takings 355
that long-standing legal rules can suddenly interfere with property rights in
unexpected ways when conditions in the world change.
Some might also raise the opposite argument: there is nothing surpris-
ing or unusual here at all. In this account, there is nothing “passive” about
the government’s role in these examples. The government did act, and did
change the law, when it originally implemented its beachfront regulations
and its zoning ordinance. While the ecological change affects the accrual
date for any takings claims based on the original regulation, the claims still
constitute challenges to governmental regulations that interfere with prop-
erty rights.33
This objection undersells the substance and importance of passive tak-
ings claims. Their distinguishing feature is that the original regulation was
not a taking when enacted. It was, and remains, constitutional. And yet the
preexisting regulation can interact with a change in the world in a way that
eventually threatens property. This interaction then triggers an affirmative
duty on the government either to change its rule or to compensate for the
harm that results from its failure to adapt to the new set of conditions. The
regulation has not changed since it was adopted, but its continued applica-
tion obligates the government to respond to an ecological change.
The theory of passive takings has implications beyond generating mod-
est doctrinal confusion over accrual dates. Indeed, the existence of passive
takings claims challenges the conventional understanding of constitutional
protections for private property and of the relationship between private
property and governmental power.34 If private property owners sue the gov-
ernment for application of a stable legal rule, they may be able to summon
the power of the state to protect their property. And the state may be consti-
tutionally required to act or risk takings liability.
The boldest version of this claim appears to diverge quite dramatically
from conventional constitutional doctrine.
C. The Constitution and Affirmative Rights
In the usual course, constitutional claims involve complaints about gov-
ernmental actions: statutory enactments, agency determinations, officials’
conduct, and the like. Opportunities for bringing constitutional claims for
33. Even on its own terms, this objection would reveal something peculiar about the
application of the statute of limitations in these kinds of cases. One court recently concluded
as follows when surveying the general limits of regulatory takings claims:
A takings claim predicated upon an act of Congress accrues on the date of the legislative
enactment because “it is fundamental jurisprudence that the act’s objective meaning and
effect were fixed when the act was adopted. Any later judicial pronouncements simply
explain, but do not create, the operative effect.”
Love Terminal Partners v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 355, 377 (2011) (alterations omitted)
(citation omitted) (quoting Barlow & Haun, Inc., v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 428, 435 (2009),
and Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
34. See infra Section I.C.
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governmental inaction are thought to be vanishingly small because the Con-
stitution primarily grants negative liberties—rights to be free from govern-
mental intrusions—rather than affirmative liberties.35
In fact, however, the possibility of affirmative constitutional duties has a
long and surprisingly conflicted history. The creation of such duties ap-
peared most promising in the context of welfare rights but ultimately proved
unsuccessful in the courts. A similar story played out in abortion funding.
That history offers important lessons for passive takings, lessons that are
both positive and cautionary.
Early conceptions of the Constitution interpreted the document as en-
shrining only negative liberties. The Framers intended to protect people—
and the states—from the encroachment of federal power.36 At a fundamen-
tal level, the Constitution was designed to protect against the potentially
coercive power of the state, not to obligate the state to act.37
The threat of coercion has changed dramatically since the founding era,
however. From the Industrial Revolution through the Great Depression, it
became increasingly apparent that the state does not have a monopoly on
coercive power and that private rights can also be exercised coercively.38 The
English philosopher T.H. Green wrote: “The individual is not in fact free
35. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989)
(rejecting due process claim for inaction); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th
Cir. 1983) (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . sought to protect Americans from oppression by
state government, not to secure them basic governmental services.”); infra text accompanying
notes 138–144; see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 864, 864–66 (1986) (discussing positive and negative constitutional rights); Arthur
Selwyn Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199, 199 (“The
law as created by the Supreme Court has been nay-saying in fact and in effect, stating in
specific instances a series of ‘thou shalt nots.’ ”); Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Con-
stitutions, 39 Rutgers L.J. 863, 868–69 (2008) (“It is an accepted principle of constitutional
law that the Federal Constitution contains only negative rights.”).
36. See Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203 (“The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not
concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to
them.”); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
761, 762 (1961) (“So widespread was the fear that the national government might encroach
upon the sovereignty of the states, and the sovereign rights of the peoples of the several states,
that a number of states were reluctant to ratify the new Constitution without an express limi-
tation on the authority of the national government to exercise certain powers.”); Steven G.
Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 770 (1995); David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the
Supreme Court’s Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 Cap. U. L. Rev. 339, 415–16 (1996)
(“From a Jeffersonian perspective, the essential purpose of the Constitution is not to empower
government but to restrain it . . . .”).
37. See Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popu-
lar Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1889, 1899 (2008).
38. See generally Barbara H. Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Rob-
ert Hale and the First Law and Economics Movement (1998) (discussing Robert Hale’s
Progressive-Era view of coercion); Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1965); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property and Protection (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
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from coercion merely because the state has not coerced him. On the con-
trary he is under pressure of some sort in respect to every act he per-
forms.”39 As one commentator observed, “An illiterate and impoverished
peasant could not be master of himself and his destiny, however jealously his
legal rights to unconstrained action might be protected.”40
With a changing economy and evolving social conditions, the federal
government and the states began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries to assume an increasingly expansive role in protecting private par-
ties from the vicissitudes of modern life. The New Deal was the most dra-
matic moment in this evolution, and it highlighted a profound
reconfiguration in the relationship between the federal government and its
citizens.41 With the development of widespread government entitlements,
from retirement and unemployment benefits to medical services for the
poor and the elderly, the federal government took a more active role in
promoting society’s well-being instead of merely protecting private rights. At
the time, the constitutionality of this expanded role was deeply fraught and
highly contested—a history that is well known to all students of American
history and constitutional law.42 Within just a few decades, however, the
constitutional question shifted from the federal government’s authority to
implement widespread social-welfare programs to its obligation to imple-
ment these programs.43
In several important articles from the 1960s and 1970s, Professors
Michelman and Reich argued that the poor and elderly were entitled to con-
stitutional protection for their public benefits.44 As an initial step, this meant
39. Harry Holloway, Mill and Green on the Modern Welfare State, 13 W. Pol. Q. 389, 397
(1960) (quoting George H. Sabine, Bosanquet’s Theory of the Real Will, 32 Phil. Rev. 633, 650
(1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Currie, supra note 35, at 868 (attributing
to Green the view that “affirmative government aid might be essential to liberty”).
40. Holloway, supra note 39, at 397 (interpreting Green).
41. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
421, 422–23 & n.1 (1987) (describing the New Deal and pointing out that it marked an evolu-
tionary not revolutionary change); see also Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal
Liberalism in Recession and War 15–16 (1995).
42. See Mark J. Stern & June Axinn, Social Welfare: A History of the American
Response to Need 168–97 (8th ed. 2012); see also Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympa-
thetic State (2013); Michelle L. VanWiggeren, Comment, Experimenting with Block Grants
and Temporary Assistance: The Attempt to Transform Welfare by Altering Federal-State Relations
and Recipients’ Due Process Rights, 46 Emory L.J. 1327, 1331–34 (1997) (providing a succinct
historical overview of the federal government’s involvement in welfare). But see William E.
Nelson, The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830–1900, at 2 (1982) (arguing that the
changes described in this account were presaged much earlier); William J. Novak, The Peo-
ple’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 1–2 (1996) (simi-
larly describing pre–New Deal regulations).
43. For a modern form of this argument, see Peñalver, supra note 38.
44. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 9 (1969) (arguing that wealth
inequality violates constitutional principles); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J.
733, 785 (1964) (arguing that government benefits can be vested entitlements that receive
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that the state had to comply with the requirements of procedural due pro-
cess and equal protection before denying government benefits.45 But
Michelman, Reich, and other advocates pushed the argument further, ulti-
mately making an explicit case for affirmative duties to provide welfare for
the poor. Or, to put it more bluntly, they argued that the government is
obligated to continue programs of public assistance.46 As Reich ultimately
concluded, “The idea of entitlement is simply that when individuals have
insufficient resources to live under conditions of health and decency, society
has obligations to provide support, and the individual is entitled to that
support as of right.”47
For a time, these arguments seemed to gain traction in the courts. Most
famously, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court recognized that eligible
recipients of certain welfare benefits were entitled to due process protections
before those benefits could be denied.48 This expansion of rights did not
continue, however. Instead, over a series of decisions, the Court whittled
away the protections it had extended in Goldberg.49 While this broad notion
of rights survives in the scholarly literature, courts have continued to re-
buff any efforts to expand affirmative federal constitutional obligations
to provide welfare rights, limiting protections to procedural due pro-
cess when rights are withdrawn.50 While some state constitutions take a
constitutional protection). See generally Arthur S. Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process
of Law?, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 399 (1962) (arguing for affirmative duties of the state).
45. See Reich, supra note 44, at 785 (“If revocation is necessary, not by reason of the fault
of the individual holder, but by reason of overriding demands of public policy, perhaps pay-
ment of just compensation would be appropriate.”); see also Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law
and the Welfare State, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 143, 154–55 (1958) (“Even more important than the
regulatory aspect of the welfare state is its office as the source of new rights—for example, the
expectations created by a comprehensive system of social insurance.”).
46. See Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State
Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 519, 522 & n.13 (1996) (reviewing literature).
47. Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
Yale L.J. 1245, 1256 (1965); see also Peñalver, supra note 38 (discussing Reich).
48. 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring procedural due process protections).
49. See William C. Rava, State Constitutional Protections for the Poor, 71 Temp. L. Rev.
543, 550 (1998) (“Goldberg represented the high-water mark for entitlement theory, however;
the Borkian view that there was no positive federal right to welfare was to ultimately prevail.”);
see also Kindred, supra note 46, at 522–23 (“The Supreme Court has adhered to the negative
rights philosophy and, thus, has rejected arguments asserting an affirmative governmental ob-
ligation under the federal Constitution to expend funds to provide resources for the poor.”).
50. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes,
and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 257, 258–59 (2000)
(“Establishing an unassailable right to welfare was once an important goal of legal academics
and activists, but is no longer. . . . The diminishing interest in this project is partly a product
of the courts’ decisive rejection of the notion that the federal Constitution, as currently writ-
ten, requires government to reduce inequality and relieve want.”). But see Susan Bandes, The
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271, 2312–13 (1990) (arguing for an
expanded recognition of affirmative obligations based on the Due Process Clause and an illu-
sory distinction between acts and omissions).
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different approach, the federal constitution’s limited scope appears well
settled.51
Abortion rights followed a similar trajectory. After the Supreme Court
ruled in Roe v. Wade52 that the state could not unduly interfere with a
woman’s right to an abortion, some scholars and litigators sought to expand
that negative liberty into a positive one that would obligate the state to fund
abortion services for women who could not afford them.53 After a flurry of
scholarly attention, the Supreme Court definitively ruled that substantive
due process only prohibits the government from interfering with a woman’s
right to an abortion; it does not obligate the government to make abortions
available to women who cannot afford them.54
Despite some important exceptions considered later—limited contexts
where courts have acknowledged the state’s obligation to act after rendering
people more susceptible to harm55—today most courts and commentators
agree with the descriptive claim that the federal Constitution protects only
negative liberties. As a constitutional matter, then, it seems particularly un-
likely that the state should have an obligation to protect property.
It is possible, however, that courts’ refusal to extend affirmative consti-
tutional duties for welfare and abortions may be more the result of judicial
skepticism about the reach of those rights than reluctance to create affirma-
tive obligations.56 Where the stakes of a constitutional case implicate ex-
panding contested rights—like the right to abortion—it is perhaps
51. For a review of state constitutional doctrines, see Pascal, supra note 35, at 869–70
(“According to one study, twenty-three state constitutions implicitly or explicitly establish pro-
tections for the poor. These constitutional provisions range from categorical statements of an
affirmative obligation on the state to care for the needy, to permissive grants of power to the
state to provide such care, to the creation of public agencies to address the needs of the poor
without any specific constitutional obligations.” (citation omitted)), and Helen Hershkoff, Pos-
itive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev.
1131 (1999).
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Ina-
lienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 330,
331–33 (1985); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1392–93 (1984).
54. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (“[A]lthough government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation.”); see also Currie, supra note 35, at 866 (attributing to Judge Posner
the view, based on the abortion cases, that “the due process clauses confer rights of protection
from rather than by the government”).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 138–145 (discussing DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
56. As an aside, the state-action doctrine does not explain this historical reluctance. That
doctrine is fundamentally about distinguishing between public and private actions and re-
mains inapposite to the issue of state inaction. E.g., Robin West, Response to State Action and a
New Birth of Freedom, 92 Geo. L.J. 819, 825–26 (2004) (rejecting the view that state-action
doctrine requires action instead of inaction); see also Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doc-
trine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1379, 1382 (2006); Mark
Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative Observa-
tions, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 435, 435 (2002).
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regrettable but not terribly surprising that courts have been hesitant to ex-
pand protections. But courts may prove more willing to expand protection
for rights that are uncontroversial and well established and that cut across
the political spectrum.
This Article thus scrambles the political valence of property rights. In
general, arguments for affirmative governmental obligations have been asso-
ciated with progressive positions—for example, whether to provide welfare
or funding for abortions.57 These arguments have traditionally been moti-
vated by normative commitments to redistribute money and resources to
the most vulnerable segments of society. The Takings Clause, in contrast, is
a favorite of conservatives.58 In recent decades, it has been held out as one of
the principal bulwarks against redistribution, requiring—according to con-
servative courts and commentators—compensation when the government
adopts redistributive policies.59 Passive takings, though, create affirmative
obligations through the Takings Clause, leveraging the protected category of
private property to compel governmental action. From a political stand-
point, this combination makes the category of passive takings unusually
plausible. And as the next Part demonstrates, passive takings are also consis-
tent with existing takings doctrine and theory.
II. Takings Theory and Affirmative Obligations
Stable legal rules coupled with ecological change can interfere with
property owners’ expectations. But should this be cognizable as a taking?
The answer depends on the operation and purpose of the Takings Clause
and on the nature of property itself. This Part argues that passive takings are
entirely consistent with existing takings and property theory. It first exam-
ines a strictly utilitarian account focusing on efficient regulatory incentives
and then provides an overview of a fairness-based account attuned to distri-
butional consequences. The Part concludes by exploring broader themes
from property theory.
It is important to highlight the stakes of the following discussion for the
Article’s central argument. This Part’s ultimate purpose is to demonstrate
that three of the leading theories animating traditional takings jurisprudence
also support passive takings. The goal here is not to defend any of these
particular approaches, nor is it to argue that any particular theory of the
Takings Clause is persuasive. The central claim is modest: that passive tak-
ings follow naturally from each of these arguments when they are considered
57. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 50, at 2343–44 (rejecting baseline of minimalist state);
Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights:
Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 Penn St. L. Rev. 923, 966–67 (2011) (describing
political history of contracting federal rights).
58. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (Justice Scalia
expanding takings protection to cover regulations that effect a total wipeout of all economi-
cally valuable uses of property).
59. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain 314–24 (1985).
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on their own terms. For that reason, this Part does not set out to canvass all
of property and takings theory but confines itself to the most prominent
approaches. The same treatment could undoubtedly be applied to other tak-
ings theories with similar effect.60
A. Utilitarian Takings Theory
According to a now-standard economic argument, the purpose of the
Takings Clause is to force the government to internalize the costs of its ac-
tions.61 Compensation prevents the government from ignoring the costs of
its regulatory burdens and ensures that it acts only where a regulation’s ben-
efits are greater than the costs it imposes.
Public-choice theorists have roundly and quite convincingly criticized
this account’s simplest form by problematizing how governments internalize
costs.62 This well-worn debate can be avoided here, however. For purposes of
the present discussion, the question is simply whether the standard eco-
nomic account—whatever its merits—applies differently to governmental
inaction than to governmental action. The answer is decisively no. If any-
thing, the asymmetry between liability for action and inaction creates its
own perverse regulatory incentives.
Compensation under the Takings Clause traditionally operates in only
one direction. It forces the government to internalize the costs of its actions
but not the costs of failing to act. In cases where governmental inaction is
the most costly choice for society, forcing the government to pay only when
it acts will discourage efficient decisionmaking. This ostensibly straightfor-
ward observation goes to the heart of the law-and-economics analysis of
regulatory takings and is worth pausing to consider in some detail.
In the traditional economic account of the Takings Clause, the compen-
sation requirement has the salutary effect of inducing efficient regulatory
incentives.63 Some property-rights theorists—most notably Professor Ep-
stein—therefore argue that takings liability should be extended to require
compensation for any regulatory burdens not offset by reciprocal benefits
(and not justified on common law nuisance grounds).64 The purpose, in
60. Most notably, a public-choice account, focused on the politics of takings liability,
should apply similarly to passive and active takings, because interest-group politics would
seem to line up in the same way around action and inaction. See infra note 62 (discussing
public-choice theory).
61. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 84–85; Posner, supra note 5, at 73–74; William A.
Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpre-
tations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269, 269–70 (1988).
62. Public-choice theorists argue that governmental actors seek to maximize their politi-
cal power and not the government’s wealth. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at
620–23; Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (2000). But see Christopher Serkin, Big Differences
for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1624,
1637 (2006) (translating fiscal into political costs in small local governments).
63. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64. Epstein, supra note 59, at 199–204.
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Epstein’s view, is to ensure that governmental actions generate net benefits.
If the government must always pay, it will act only when doing so comes
with more benefits than costs.
Imagine a stylized example where a governmental agency is considering
whether to require factories to install scrubbers to minimize air pollution.
From Epstein’s perspective, if those scrubbers will cost affected industries $1
million, the government should have to pay; otherwise, there is no way to
test whether the regulatory benefit of cleaner air is actually worth the $1
million. Requiring the government to compensate tests the government’s
decision and ensures that the regulation is generating more benefits for the
public than harm to property owners.65
Even on its own terms, however, that traditional analysis misses half of
the equation. There are also costs associated with governmental inaction:
continued air pollution, in this example.66 Allowing the government to avoid
internalizing those costs will systematically favor inaction over action. If the
goal is to ensure maximally efficient regulatory regimes, the government
should have to pay the costs of both its actions and forgone actions. Only
then would the government internalize the full impact of its decisions, in-
cluding its decisions not to regulate.
The traditional economic account of the Takings Clause, even in its
most extreme form, fails to ensure efficient levels of regulatory activity. At
best, it ensures only that specific regulations do not generate more harm
than gain. It provides no protection for property owners who would have
substantially benefited from a regulation that the government failed to
adopt, even if the forgone benefits—or harms from inaction—dwarf the
costs of any governmental action. If the goal is not simply to constrain gov-
ernment but also to ensure efficient decisionmaking, the government should
be liable for regulatory inaction as well.67
This insight has an additional payoff. Takings theorists have long puz-
zled over how the compensation requirement relates to regulatory benefits.68
65. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 62, at 366 (“Intuitively, a takings system that demands
compensation for any net loser from a given regulation . . . will effectively prevent any regula-
tion that does not create social benefits at least sufficient to cover its own costs.”). Professor
Levinson ultimately criticizes this view, but his articulation neatly captures the underlying
intuition.
66. Cf. id. (arguing that economic accounts of the Takings Clause provide no explanation
for how governments internalize regulatory benefits).
67. Cf. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 295 (2003) (proposing offsetting
value of governmental benefits from public land acquisition of coastal property); Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 590–608 (2001) (proposing a mecha-
nism for the government to collect the benefits its regulations confer on property owners).
68. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s In-
vestment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doc-
trine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 96–100 (2003) (discussing asymmetry in internalization of costs
and benefits); Levinson, supra note 62, at 350 (“If government does not fully internalize the
costs of takings unless it must spend its revenues to pay compensation, then why should we
expect government to fully internalize the benefits of takings when it does not receive them in
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The Constitution, after all, contains no “Givings Clause.”69 While the gov-
ernment must sometimes pay when it imposes too great a regulatory bur-
den, it has no easy way to capture the benefits of regulatory largesse. This
situation produces a perplexing asymmetry: if the government downzones
property, it may have to pay for the regulatory burdens it imposes; but if it
upzones property, it has no obvious mechanism for capturing the substan-
tial benefits such upzoning creates.70
In response, scholars have proposed creative if highly theoretical re-
sponses. Professors Bell and Parchomovsky argue for a formal “Givings
Clause” to counterbalance the Takings Clause.71 Levinson uses the asymme-
try to argue against mandatory compensation, even for takings.72 But such
radical solutions are not actually required. Passive takings can serve this
same function, albeit from a different direction.
If the government can avoid passive takings liability by acting, it will
internalize the benefits of those actions.73 This is so because avoiding liability
is—aside from the baseline—conceptually indistinguishable from receiving
payment. Forcing the government to pay for forgone benefits when it fails to
act (i.e., passive takings liability) therefore amounts to allowing the govern-
ment to recover payment for the benefits of its actions. A stylized example is
illustrative. Imagine that upzoning property would increase its value from
$10 to $100. A simplified givings regime would allow the government to
collect that $90 surplus for upzoning the property. Passive takings, by con-
trast, could make the government liable for failing to upzone the property.
By not acting, the government would have to pay $90. Alternatively, the
government can avoid that $90 passive takings liability by upzoning the
property. By acting, then, the government is $90 richer (in compensation
avoided instead of in givings recaptured), but the result is the same. Passive
takings can therefore provide the symmetry missing from the traditional
takings equation.
Admittedly, passive takings liability does not fill this role perfectly. It
would allow the government to internalize only the benefits that, if forgone,
would constitute a passive taking. In the zoning context, for example, such a
situation would occur only if the government would have been liable under
the form of revenues?”); sources cited supra note 67; see also Kaplow, supra note 2, at 567–68
(pointing out the asymmetry).
69. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67, at 551 (“The Fifth Amendment bars only
uncompensated takings; there is no ‘Givings Clause.’ ” (citation omitted)).
70. See sources cited supra note 68.
71. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67, at 618.
72. Levinson, supra note 62, at 415 (“The picture that emerges . . . should inspire skepti-
cism about the desirability of mandatory compensation for takings and constitutional torts.”).
73. Environmental review provides an interesting analogy. According to the regulations
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, an agency evaluating environmental
harms must consider a “no-action” alternative. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(d), 1508.25(b)(1)
(2013). Before rejecting (or adopting) an alternative, the lead agency is therefore required to
consider the environmental harm of doing nothing. Passive takings exert an economic force
similar to the informational pressure of the no-action alternative.
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the Takings Clause for failing to upzone land. Under the test articulated in
Part III, passive takings liability in such a case would be rare.74 Nevertheless,
even if it is not a perfect substitute for a regime of givings recapture, passive
takings exerts a modest force in the same direction, and in this sense it at
least partially fills a critical hole in the economic account of the Takings
Clause. What it lacks in perfection, moreover, it makes up in plausibility. It
does not require a radical change in the law—only a natural extension of
existing takings law.75
A utilitarian account of the Takings Clause, focusing as it does on creat-
ing efficient regulatory incentives, should require compensation for both
regulatory action and inaction. Indeed, the economic logic of the Takings
Clause applies equally to governmental inaction.
B. Fairness-Based Takings Theory
The category of passive takings is consistent not only with a utilitarian
account of the Takings Clause but with a fairness-based one as well. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court in Armstrong v. United States, the purpose of the
Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”76 This principle has defied easy application. But under
any interpretation, it applies to regulatory inaction just as plausibly as it
does to regulatory action.
At the highest level of generality, a number of important takings theo-
ries all advance the same overarching principle: the purpose of the Takings
Clause is to prevent the government from singling people out for dispropor-
tionate regulatory burdens.77 The nature of this concern varies, however.
According to Professor Fischel, for example, takings protection should be at
its strongest when political protection is at its weakest—specifically in cases
where owners of undeveloped land confront regulatory burdens imposed by
74. See infra Section III.B. Passive takings liability is not a freestanding obligation on
government to maximize the value of all property; it is considerably narrower in scope.
75. Professor Been and Joel Beauvais offer a similar response when they focus on prop-
erty taxes as an imperfect but nevertheless important mechanism by which governments inter-
nalize regulatory benefits. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 68, at 97–100. These arguments are
complementary and are not mutually exclusive.
76. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For an exploration of this principle, see generally William
Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Stat-
utes, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1151 (1997).
77. See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings 139 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, Public
Choice and Just Compensation, 9 Const. Comment. 279, 300–03 (1992); John E. Fee, The
Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1003, 1004 (2003); Saul Levmore,
Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333, 1338 (1991); see also William Michael
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum.
L. Rev. 782, 866–72 (1995) (reviewing literature). But see Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of
Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 37–52 (2008) (arguing against an equality-based
conception of takings liability).
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small homeowner-dominated local governments.78 Professor Dagan argues,
in contrast, that takings protection should be explicitly progressive, safe-
guarding the poor over the wealthy in order to offset the natural political
pressures in the other direction.79 Similar themes abound in the literature.80
Whatever the source of the singling-out concern, the government can
disproportionately harm individuals or groups either by imposing regula-
tory burdens or by withholding regulatory assistance.81 A government that
extends regulatory benefits—whether through land-use controls, infrastruc-
ture, or public services—to most but not all of its citizens imposes a kind of
regulatory harm on the excluded group. If benefits are sufficiently available
such that they effectively define the baseline of expectations, failing to pro-
vide the minimum to everyone produces unfair regulatory distributions that
are indistinguishable from the “affirmative” imposition of harm.82 Alterna-
tively, treating unequal people similarly can produce results that are just as
unfair as treating similar people unequally.83 Fairness in the context of tak-
ings law centers on the ultimate distribution of burdens and benefits, and
withholding benefits can affect that distribution as much as affirmative ac-
tion can. From the perspective of promoting a fair distribution of burdens
and benefits in society, takings liability should be available both for govern-
mental action and inaction.
A more formal distributional account of the Takings Clause comes from
Michelman’s seminal article in the field.84 Michelman recognizes that there
are costs—real costs—associated both with compensating and with failing
to compensate for regulatory burdens under the Takings Clause, and he ar-
gues that the goal should be to avoid whichever one is greater. According to
Michelman, then, the government should pay compensation when demoral-
ization costs (i.e., the costs of not paying compensation) outweigh settle-
ment costs (i.e., the costs of paying compensation).85
78. See Fischel, supra note 77, at 139; see also Serkin, supra note 15, at 1279 n.264
(interpreting Fischel).
79. See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 77, at 306 (“[B]ecause the legislature will usually offer
compensation voluntarily, the takings clause can be defended as a prophylactic barrier against
a serious form of discrimination against politically disfavored groups.”); Levmore, supra note
77, at 1348 (“Compensation for a governmental intervention will be required when a politi-
cally unprotected loser is singled out and when there is a close substitute in the form of a
private purchase.”).
81. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67, at 554 (“[I]t is inequitable to bestow a
benefit upon some people that, in all fairness and justice, should be given to the public as a
whole. In a giving, a small group is able to force the public as a whole to subsidize the group’s
preferential treatment.”).
82. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 50, at 2283–84.
83. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
1167, 1173–75 (1983) (describing principles of equality as applied to “unequals”).
84. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
85. Id. at 1215. Demoralization costs include the psychological costs associated with un-
fair burdens as well as the resulting forgone investments for fear of being targeted next. Id. at
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This argument also applies to passive takings because demoralization
costs arise from governmental inaction as well. Professor Davidson discusses
this possibility from a different perspective, insightfully exploring what he
terms a “morale benefit” that people receive from governmental responsive-
ness.86 He states: “[T]he up-front understanding that the rules can adjust
under the right circumstances and will do so fairly and inclusively may be
the inducement needed for someone to work, invest, create, attach, join, or
do any of the other things traditionally associated with the signal of legal
stability.”87 Or, to reframe his point from a different baseline, the govern-
ment’s failure to adjust rules in this way can undermine people’s incentives
to work, invest, and the like. Governmental inaction can be demoralizing,
too.
This is only half of the equation, however, because there are settlement
costs associated with passive takings claims as well. In Michelman’s terms,
settlement costs are the costs of identifying affected property owners, valu-
ing their claims, and actually effectuating compensation.88 Such costs are
likely to be impossibly high in most cases of regulatory inaction. The gov-
ernment, after all, is constantly not acting. And just as government “hardly
could go on” if it had to pay for every regulatory burden it imposed, it
would surely collapse if it had to pay for every regulatory benefit it failed to
provide.89 The latter would be truly unlimited.
As Michelman demonstrated for affirmative regulations, however, it is
sometimes possible to identify the general contexts that are likely to produce
particularly high demoralization costs coupled with low settlement costs.
Where that combination exists, the government should pay compensation.
In Michelman’s view, the combination is most likely when the government
interferes with existing uses of property, significantly decreases the value of
property, or permanently occupies property.90 In each of those cases, the
universe of affected property owners is reasonably small, and the demorali-
zation resulting from the governmental action is extremely high. Liability for
1214. See generally William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings
Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774, 1778 (1988) (discussing scholarly treatment of demoraliza-
tion and settlement costs).
86. Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 437 (2011).
87. Id. at 470.
88. Michelman, supra note 84, at 1214. Settlement costs do not include the compensa-
tion itself; those costs are factored into the efficiency gains of a regulation. See Fisher, supra
note 85, at 1777 n.18.
89. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.”).
90. Michelman, supra note 84, at 1236–44. This became the Penn Central test. Serkin,
supra note 15, at 1255 n.162 (citing sources).
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passive takings can arise under just the same conditions (and Part IV pro-
vides examples).91 At least in this theoretical account, then, there is no rea-
son to limit Michelman’s “felicific” calculus to action alone.92
C. Property Theory
On a broader level, the operation of the Takings Clause fundamentally
depends on the content of property rights. There can be no taking if prop-
erty law does not confer the burdened right.93 As a result, some of the recent
leading scholarship on the Takings Clause really consists of general property
theory. This scholarship also implicitly supports the existence of passive tak-
ings claims.
Property—somewhat like the Constitution itself—has often been
viewed as creating a sphere of negative liberty.94 According to Blackstone’s
early definition, property is “that sole and despotic dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total ex-
clusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”95 Property, in
this view, is a right to be free from interference by others. And yet this
conception ignores the inherently social nature of property.
Important modern theorists have pushed back against the centrality of
exclusion and argue that property’s value, significance, and meaning come
only in relation to other people.96 As Professor Demsetz pithily recognized,
“[i]n the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role.”97 Most
91. See infra Section III.B (defining the test for passive takings); infra Section IV.B (justi-
fying application of passive takings to sea-level rise).
92. Michelman’s approach does not apply identically to passive and active takings. His
takings analysis assumes that the governmental regulation is efficient and that the goal is
therefore to minimize the social costs of beneficial regulations. Michelman, supra note 84, at
1196. Applied to passive takings, Michelman’s compensation formula should be triggered only
in the context of efficient governmental inaction—that is, where governmental inaction will
generate a net social benefit. But the definition of “efficient governmental inaction” is not at
all obvious. A lot depends on crafting principled limits so that the government is not made
liable for the infinite variety of actions it does not take. See infra Section III.B (setting out the
passive takings test).
93. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“[The state] may
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”).
94. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730,
734–35 (1998); see also James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Con-
stitutional History of Property Rights (3d ed. 2008) (taking a historical look at constitu-
tional prohibitions on property regulation); J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law
(1997) (positing that property rights are entirely about the right of exclusive use and
possession).
95. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
96. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10
Theoretical Inquiries L. 127, 135 (2009).
97. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 347
(1967).
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legal initiates today view property not merely as some abstract right of ex-
clusion that property owners enjoy but instead as a bundle of rights that
owners possess against other people vis-à-vis a resource in the world—rights
that can be reconfigured without eliminating the category of “property.”98
This relational aspect of property means that expanding one person’s rights
necessarily restricts another person’s rights. Expanding the right to exclude,
for example, restricts others’ right to access a resource.99 This exclusion, in
turn, has led to increased attention to the rights of nonowners and specifi-
cally to property owners’ obligations to them.100
This insight is not new. Traditional nuisance law, governed by its Latin
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, barred people from using their
property in a way that interfered with others’ use of their own property.101
But instead of defining the outer boundaries of ownership, the interests and
claims of nonowners today are increasingly viewed as central to private
property.102 Whether considering the ubiquity of zoning ordinances, envi-
ronmental controls, or simply the broad swath of regulations governing
98. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, American Property: A History of How, Why, and
What We Own 57–58 (2011) (discussing the history of the bundle-of-rights metaphor). But
see Merrill, supra note 94, at 753–55 (arguing against the bundle theory); Henry E. Smith,
Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 1700 (2012) (criticizing bundle
theories).
99. Professors Merrill and Smith, leading opponents of the legal-realist conception of
property as a bundle of rights, still accept that exclusion rights can vary depending on the
strength of the claims of the person or group being excluded. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 94,
at 753 (acknowledging occasional limits on the right to exclude); Henry E. Smith, Mind the
Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L.
Rev. 959, 971 (2009) (same).
100. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745 (2009); Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 96; Hanoch Dagan,
Essay, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1255 (2007). For a review of
the leading literature on this issue, see Christopher Serkin, Affirmative Constitutional Commit-
ments: The State’s Obligations to Property Owners, 2 Brigham-Kanner Prop. Rts. Conf. J.
109 (2013).
101. See Alexander, supra note 100, at 746–47 (identifying the nuisance maxim as an
“obvious example” of the limit on property owners’ rights). The Latin phrase translates
roughly as “use thine own so that thou doest no harm to another.” William L. Prosser, Nui-
sance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 418 n.151 (1942).
102. See Alexander, supra note 100, at 746 (“[T]he core function of private property, at
least according to conventional lore, is to insulate individuals from the demands of society
both in its organized political form and its non-political collective form.”); see also Hanoch
Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions 41 (2011) (“[S]haring and cooperation in
[property] doctrines are not the choice of a person who already enjoys sole and despotic
dominion, but rather a constitutive feature of the property institution, which defines the con-
tent of that person’s property right.”); J. Peter Byrne, The Public Nature of Property Rights and
the Property Nature of Public Law, in The Public Nature of Private Property 1, 4 (Robin
Paul Malloy & Michael Diamond eds., 2011) (“[L]egislation and administrative oversight cre-
ate new opportunities to recognize a variety of rights and duties, none of which should be
considered ‘outside’ property law.”). But see Smith, supra note 99, at 971 (characterizing such
limits as peripheral); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, The Possession Heuristic, in The
Law and Economics of Possession (Yung-Chien Chang ed.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at
28) (on file with author) (describing core–periphery debate).
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many aspects of our lives, the claims and demands of other people are fully
embedded in the core of property.
This socially driven view of property necessitates substantial limits on
the right to exclude. Exclusion, and property more generally, cannot be used
in ways that place too great a burden on the community. But there is an
even more striking consequence. Property does not have to consist exclu-
sively of negative rights—that is, rights to be free from intrusion by
others—but can also contain affirmative obligations to the rest of the com-
munity.103 And if property includes obligations to the community, then—
according to some theorists—the state can recognize those obligations and
make substantial demands of property owners without invading property
rights.104 Not only must property owners allow access and entry to those in
need,105 but owners can also be called upon to use their property to benefit
society more generally, by preserving historic or environmental resources on
their land, by maintaining a certain amount of open space, and so forth.106
Property owners therefore have state-recognized obligations to use—or
forgo using—their property in specific ways to advance the well-being of
society as a whole.
Importantly, however, community needs can change. The substantive
content of property rights can therefore also change.107 The state can thus
impose new obligations on owners as society’s needs evolve.108 Environmen-
tal regulations, for example, become justifiable as the nature of—and our
understanding of—the threats of environmental damage advances.109 And a
103. See Alexander, supra note 100; Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 96.
104. See sources cited supra note 103; see also Dagan, supra note 102, at 41. In one mod-
ern formulation, property as an institution is really just the delegation by the state of decision-
making authority vis-à-vis a particular resource in the world. See Larissa Katz, Governing
Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2029, 2046 (2012) (“[A] state delegates ownership authority in the form of a grant, to
which it then attaches terms and conditions, just as a private property owner might.”).
105. E.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908); cf. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J.
1971) (holding that it was not trespass for a service worker and an attorney to enter the land of
another without his permission in order to aid a migrant laborer working on the land).
106. See Alexander, supra note 100, at 791–810 (discussing contexts where private prop-
erty rights are restricted for various public goods needed to promote “human flourishing”);
Smith, supra note 99, at 961 (critiquing Alexander and providing an alternative account for the
interaction of private property rights and “human flourishing”).
107. See Serkin, supra note 100, at 131 (“For community-minded theorists, unlike liber-
tarians, property is a dynamic institution that evolves as the world and the community
changes.”).
108. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926) (upholding
zoning in light of social changes).
109. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 661–62 (1887). But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)
(linking harm-prevention to common law nuisance). As Justice Blackmun wrote in his Lucas
dissent, however, “There is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. . . . If judges
in the 18th and 19th centuries can distinguish a harm from a benefit, why not judges in the
20th century, and if judges can, why not legislators?” Id. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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zoning regulation that might not have been permissible in an agrarian soci-
ety becomes entirely consistent with limits on owners’ property rights in the
context of urbanization.110 Therefore, the same regulation that might have
been a taking at one time might not be later as conditions in the world
change. So far, this is a relatively conventional description of an emerging
strand of property scholarship.
Less conventional, and indeed generally unnoticed, is that the change
can happen in the opposite direction as well: preexisting obligations can
become unjustifiable as conditions in the world change. Community-im-
posed obligations can thus become two-way streets, and property owners
can then make demands of the state. How and when this occurs varies de-
pending on the underlying account of the relationship between property and
community. Dagan, for example, emphasizes the implicit promise that regu-
latory burdens will be offset by reciprocal benefits, and so he calls for takings
liability only where that is not the case (on average and over the long
term).111 But as I have previously pointed out, “That implicit promise creates
an ongoing obligation on the state until the benefits are, in fact, repaid.”112
The promise of future benefits may not actually materialize, and indeed
changes in the world may undermine the average reciprocity that property
owners were to receive. When that happens, the justification for the govern-
ment’s regulatory burden disappears, and the government has failed to live
up to its side of the bargain.113
Professors Alexander and Peñalver argue for a more general source of
social obligations based on notions of human flourishing.114 They contend
that, because we are inherently social beings, valuing human flourishing re-
quires valuing it in others as well as in ourselves.115 But Alexander and
Peñalver concede a limit, defined at least partly by owners’ own capacity to
flourish. Where regulatory burdens go so far as to implicate owners’ flour-
ishing—as they use the term—or where the burdens do not produce genu-
ine benefits to the community, they too can become unjustifiable over
time.116
110. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386–87, 392 (upholding zoning based on new urban
pressures).
111. Dagan, supra note 79, at 769–70; see also Alexander, supra note 100, at 758–60 (dis-
cussing Dagan).
112. Serkin, supra note 100, at 125.
113. Id. at 125–26 (examining the implication of Dagan’s theory for affirmative obliga-
tions on the state).
114. Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Introduction, in Property and Com-
munity (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010); Gregory S. Alexander,
Pluralism and Property, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1017, 1045–47 (2011); Alexander, supra note 100,
at 760–73; Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 96.
115. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 96, at 134–36 (citing, inter alia, Amartya Sen,
Development as Freedom (1999) and Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Devel-
opment (2000)). Alexander actually offers three different possible justifications for this argu-
ment, one Aristotelian, one based on long-term individual self-interest, and one based on
Kant’s categorical imperative. Alexander, supra note 100, at 768–69.
116. See Serkin, supra note 100, at 128–29 (discussing human flourishing).
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Both of these theories are nuanced and produce different limits for tak-
ings liability, but they share a fundamental insight: the substantive content
of property is constrained by—if not defined by—obligations to the com-
munity.117 As the community’s needs change, so too do the demands it can
make of property owners.118 The role of the state, then, is to act as a kind of
mediator between property owners and the community in which the prop-
erty is located.119 But because those community needs are dynamic, the
state’s role in constituting property rights must also be dynamic. Regulations
and obligations that were not justifiable before may become so over time—a
central point in the work of Alexander and Peñalver. Conversely, though,
regulations and obligations that were justifiable when enacted may become
unjustifiable through the very same mechanisms.
Unlike a libertarian state, whose role is limited primarily to defending
private rights of exclusion, a communitarian state cannot simply set the
rules and then sit on the sidelines while private parties fight it out. Because
the state is intimately bound up with the creation of rights based on the
ever-changing needs of society, the state can be compelled to act when the
content of those rights is no longer justified by conditions in the world.120
The substantive content of property can indeed support passive takings
claims.
***
The argument up to this point has admittedly been broad and abstract.
Nothing so far has suggested when, or how, the government is required af-
firmatively to protect property. It is certainly not the case that the govern-
ment has a generalized obligation to protect all property from all intrusions.
Much of the rest of this Article is devoted to exploring these complicated
questions and limitations. But it is nevertheless important to pause here and
highlight the central claim in this Part: traditional property and takings the-
ories support recognizing affirmative rights against the government—rights
that require the government to undertake affirmative actions to avoid violat-
ing the Constitution.
117. For a more detailed exploration of these competing visions, see id. at 117–32.
118. Id. at 129 (“As communities change, and as the conditions of property owners
change, burdens that once were innocuous can implicate owners’ capacity for flourishing or
outlive their usefulness. In either situation, the once-appropriate regulatory burden can be-
come unjustifiable at least on grounds of promoting human flourishing.”).
119. Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 50 (1977)
(“[Joseph] Sax urges us to recognize that the modern welfare state seeks to discharge govern-
mental functions far more ambitious than those attempted by the watchman state of classic
laissez-faire theory. No longer do officials content themselves with mediating conflicts that
private parties are unable or unwilling to resolve by other means . . . .” (citing Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964))).
120. See Serkin, supra note 100, at 131.
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III. Passive Takings
The Article so far has made a theoretical case for the plausibility of pas-
sive takings claims—that is, takings claims against the government for fail-
ing to act—but it has not yet attempted to specify when such claims actually
arise. It is one thing to argue for a state’s duty to act based on relatively
abstract moral commitments and theoretical conceptions of efficiency and
the nature of property, but it is another entirely to identify the conditions
under which the Takings Clause imposes an affirmative obligation on the
state. As it turns out, the possibility of passive takings claims is not only
theoretically sound but also doctrinally plausible and normatively desirable.
The fundamental insight in this Part is that the problem of distinguish-
ing between acts and omissions—well-known in other contexts—applies
also to the Takings Clause. Inaction can result in legally cognizable harms in
administrative law, torts, and criminal law, and analogous situations in
property can generate passive takings. By and large, omissions liability re-
sults when the distinction between acts and omissions breaks down. The
work of this Part is to generalize, from these other doctrinal fields, when
that distinction loses its salience. To be clear, there may be other bases for
passive takings liability as well, but the goal of this Part, and of the Article
more broadly, is simply to demonstrate that the category exists. Therefore,
the focus here is on the places where such liability is the most likely.
This Part begins by explicating the distinction between acts and omis-
sions in these other areas of law and then applies those insights to illuminate
the doctrinal outlines of passive takings claims. The Part concludes by ad-
dressing some of the most persuasive counterarguments against extending
takings liability to governmental inaction.
A. The Act/Omission Distinction
In many areas of law, liability for inaction is hardly a novel concept. In
fact, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) explicitly provides for judi-
cial review of agency inaction.121 While the contours of that judicial review
remain limited and sharply contested, that an agency can violate federal law
through failing to act is reasonably well established.122 As Justice Marshall
explained, “[O]ne of the very purposes fueling the birth of administrative
agencies was the reality that governmental refusal to act could have just as
devastating an effect on life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as coercive
121. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012); see also Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial
Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 461, 464–67 (2008)
(describing the APA); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrari-
ness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657, 1664–75 (2004) (same).
122. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007); see also Biber, supra note
121, at 462 (“[E]ven within administrative law, judicial review of agency inaction stands out
for the confusion it causes.”); cf. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 319
(1930) (extending review to agency inaction).
December 2014] Passive Takings 373
governmental action.”123 He should have added property to that mix of in-
terests at stake. The harm resulting from inaction can be just as damaging as
the harm resulting from overt action.124
Sometimes the distinction between action and inaction entirely breaks
down. As Professor Biber notes, “[A]n agency’s decision not to release infor-
mation pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act . . . could be treated
either as an agency action (decision not to release), or a failure to act (failure
to comply with the statute’s requirements that information must be re-
leased).”125 The problem was on stark display in Minnesota Pesticide Infor-
mation & Education, Inc. v. Espy.126 In that case, the plaintiffs sued following
the U.S. Forest Service’s failure to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment for its decision not to use a particular herbicide to control vegeta-
tion.127 The Supreme Court reasoned that the Forest Service had “effectively
elected a course of temporary inaction” for which review was unavailable,
even though the decision amounted to adopting an alternative strategy of
vegetation control.128 The distinction between action and inaction becomes
especially blurry in instances where the government has exercised substantial
control over an area. Then, its decision not to act allocates harm as surely as
a decision to act—whether it is the Forest Service’s choice not to use pesti-
cides or a town’s choice not to permit sea walls. Of course, there are many
situations in which the difference between action and inaction is clear, but,
when it is not, the different legal consequences that traditionally follow be-
come difficult to justify.129
123. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 851 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
124. This does not make passive takings for agencies redundant, because the APA does not
create a freestanding obligation on agencies to act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). Instead, the
statute merely recognizes that federal law can require agencies to act and therefore provides for
judicial review of inaction in that context. Cf. Bressman, supra note 121, at 1664 (discussing
agency inaction and focusing on the instances “in which an agency refuses to enforce statutory
or regulatory requirements or prohibitions against known or suspected violators”).
125. Biber, supra note 121, at 466. Biber asserts that “there are many examples of courts in
administrative law having difficulty drawing the dividing line” between agency action and
inaction. Id.; see also Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law,
60 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 11–13 (2008) (describing difficulty in distinguishing between agency
action and inaction).
126. 29 F.3d 442, 443–44 (8th Cir. 1994).
127. Espy, 29 F.3d 442. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires an agency
to prepare an environmental impact statement for every “major Federal action[ ] significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.” National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
§ 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
128. Espy, 29 F.3d at 443.
129. At the end of the day, this is the central insight reflected in administrative law and,
more specifically, in scholarship advocating for symmetrical treatment of agency action and
inaction. See, e.g., Biber, supra note 121, at 463–64, 469–70; Bressman, supra note 121, at
1686–96.
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Broader theories of liability reflect this same impulse, whether they orig-
inate in tort or criminal law.130 Failing to throw a rope to a drowning swim-
mer is one thing; failing to hit the brakes to avoid a pedestrian while driving
is something else altogether.131 Both can be characterized as omissions (or
inaction), but there is a critical difference between the two examples. In the
latter, the driver “played a part in the creation of the very danger that he
subsequently failed to abate.”132 As Professor Weinrib cogently explains,
there is a difference between “real nonfeasance” and “pseudo-nonfeasance,”
which is characterized by a complicity in creating the underlying risk.133 Set-
ting in motion events that expose someone to injury or harm can create an
affirmative duty to act in order to address that harm.
Indeed, focusing too narrowly on an affirmative-act requirement can
obscure the imposition of real and cognizable harm. One traditional view
holds that a physical act, involving some volitional movement, is necessary
for criminal liability.134 But what of a parent who fails to feed an infant and
so starves her to death?135 This is criminally culpable, and for the same rea-
son discussed above: the infant and her welfare are entirely within the con-
trol of her parent. Professor Husak aptly terms this the control principle,
130. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 8, at 256–57. Biber also recognizes the applicability of
the tort literature to the administrative-law context, although he chooses not to explore it.
Biber, supra note 121, at 466 (“One need not resort to the large body of literature in torts
about the difficulties of distinguishing between the two fields to understand the problem
here . . . .”).
131. Weinrib, supra note 8, at 253–54; see also Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton,
Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 Yale L.J. 1272, 1272–73 (1949) (relying on a version of the
failure-to-brake example). But see John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers:
Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect
Others, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 867, 878 (“Two fundamental problems plague the distinction be-
tween misfeasance and nonfeasance: (1) in many cases it is impossible to distinguish the two;
and, (2) in cases where intuitively there is a clear distinction, that distinction does not always
coincide with generally accepted notions about whether liability should attach.”).
132. See Weinrib, supra note 8, at 253–54; see also McNiece & Thornton, supra note 131,
at 1273 (“There is no pure nonfeasance [in this failure-to-brake example] because the defen-
dant has acted.”).
133. See Weinrib, supra note 8, at 253–56 (“Participation by the defendant in the creation
of the risk, even if such participation is innocent, is thus the crucial factor in distinguishing
misfeasance from nonfeasance.”); cf. Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omis-
sions, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 547, 558 (1988) (identifying “creation of peril” as a basis for liability
but acknowledging that “[t]he cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone
innocently or accidentally imperils another”).
134. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime 46–59 (1993); see also Francisco
Muñoz-Conde & Luis Ernesto Chiesa, The Act Requirement as a Basic Concept of Criminal Law,
28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2461, 2470–71 (2007) (criticizing Moore’s theory of action); Michael
Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1529, 1529 n.1
(1994) (identifying the voluntary act requirement’s defenders). According to Professor Moore,
criminal liability for failing to act unduly burdens people’s liberty. See Muñoz-Conde &
Chiesa, supra, at 2473 (“For Moore, punishing omissions is problematic because doing so
diminishes our liberty to act much more than criminalizing actions.”).
135. See, e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1207, 1220 (2009)
(discussing omissions liability and possession crimes); Francis Barry McCarthy, Crimes of
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which can serve as a basis for liability even in the absence of an obvious
volitional act.136
The overarching intuition about the hazy boundary between acts and
omissions is that liability should depend on the extent of the defendant’s
entanglement with the conditions giving rise to the injury.137 That entangle-
ment can occur at some earlier point in time—as when the driver gets in a
car—or through sufficient ongoing control over the relevant conditions. In
other words, liability does not necessarily depend on some specific and
decontextualized act.
This intuition is consistent with one of the narrow contexts in which the
Supreme Court has actually recognized the state’s affirmative constitutional
obligation: to protect people in state custody. While the cases establishing
this obligation all involve liberty interests and are rooted in substantive due
process, their reasoning extends naturally and even more broadly to
property.
The leading case to wrestle with the state’s duty to protect is DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.138 There, the Supreme
Court rejected a due process challenge based upon Wisconsin’s failure to
protect a child from his abusive father.139 The facts of the case are horrifying,
but the Court’s reasoning is illuminating. Joshua DeShaney, four years old,
was in his father’s custody. Several people, including physicians and state
workers, suspected that Joshua’s father was abusing him. The state did not
intervene to remove Joshua from his father’s custody, and Joshua’s father
eventually beat him so badly that he caused permanent brain damage result-
ing in lifetime institutionalization. Joshua and his mother sued the state and
various state employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they had de-
prived Joshua of his liberty without due process of law. The Supreme Court
rejected the challenge, holding that the Due Process Clause “is phrased as a
limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal
Omission in Pennsylvania, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 633, 639 (1995) (examining failure to feed);
Muñoz-Conde & Chiesa, supra note 134, at 2471 (“The mother who contributes to her new-
born child’s death by intentionally refusing to feed her is as deserving of blame as the mother
who contributes to her baby’s death by feeding her food that makes her sick.”); see also Paul H.
Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 609, 672–75 (1984) (discussing omission
offenses).
136. Douglas N. Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law 97–100 (1987). These are con-
texts in which society understands the defendant to have acted, even in the absence of a spe-
cific volitional physical movement. Some commentators, therefore, have focused on the
communicative aspect of the defendant’s behavior as a basis for liability. See 1 George P.
Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law 281–85 (2007); see also Muñoz-Conde & Chiesa,
supra note 134, at 2464–65.
137. Cf. Leavens, supra note 133, at 557–59 (summarizing bases for duties). From Profes-
sor Leavens’s list, the source of duties most relevant here is the “[d]uty arising from the crea-
tion of peril” and the “[d]uty arising from voluntary assumption of care.” Id. at 558–59.
138. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
139. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
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levels of safety and security.”140 This opinion, of course, represents an en-
tirely orthodox view of the Constitution as enshrining exclusively negative
liberties.141
While the Court in DeShaney rejected the plaintiffs’ due process claims
for the state’s failure to act, it did so only after identifying and distinguishing
cases in which the state was held to have ongoing affirmative obligations;
namely, when the state incarcerates someone or involuntarily commits
someone for psychological or medical purposes. In other words, the state is
obligated to act when it has taken control of someone and has rendered that
person especially vulnerable to a subsequent harm.142 As the Court ex-
plained, “While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do
anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.”143 Indeed, “[the
State] placed [plaintiff] in no worse position than that in which he would
have been had it not acted at all.”144 The inference, though, is that the state
may have an affirmative duty to protect if it created a danger or left people
more susceptible to a danger.145
This same inference has a direct application to the Takings Clause.146
Certain strands of takings cases have, in fact, implicitly rejected a firm line
between governmental action and inaction, although in ways that have
largely gone unnoticed. In the zoning context, in particular, a planning com-
mission’s rejection of a request for a rezoning is conventionally cognizable as
a taking and is treated by courts as conceptually indistinguishable from a
zoning change.147 By and large, these courts have ignored the act/omission
140. Id. at 195; see also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”).
141. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
142. The Court characterized this as an affirmative duty to protect, one that arises from
“the limitation which [the State] has imposed on [an individual’s] freedom to act on his own
behalf.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. “The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s
knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but
from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” Id.
143. Id. at 201; see also Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a
Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 107, 114 (1991).
144. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
145. The same impulse was at work in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975) (“The purpose of the [Nonintercourse] Act [is to]
guarantee the Indian tribes’ right of occupancy and clearly there can be no meaningful guar-
antee without a corresponding federal duty to investigate and take such action as may be
warranted in the circumstances.” (citation omitted)). I thank Joe Singer for drawing this case
and issue to my attention.
146. Of course, takings—and constitutional deprivations of property—are not torts.
Analogizing torts to takings law is intended only for illustrative purposes. But see Eric Kades,
Avoiding Takings “Accidents”: A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1235
(1994) (arguing for a tort-based conception of takings law); Levmore, supra note 77, at
1335–40 (examining takings from a torts perspective).
147. See, e.g., Exec. 100, Inc. v. Martin Cnty., 922 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A
plaintiff seeking to challenge a local government’s refusal to rezone his property may bring
four different causes of action,” including a takings claim); Jack v. City of Olathe, 781 P.2d
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distinction and have simply assumed that denying a zoning change is a gov-
ernmental act subject to traditional takings analysis.
That result, however, should be surprising. Refusing to change the law
does not usually trigger takings liability. Imagine, for example, that someone
petitions Congress to compel banks to write down the principal on under-
water mortgages. If Congress rejects the request—either by refusing to take
up the matter or by voting it down—this conduct will not give rise to a
takings claim. Under a traditional takings analysis, enacting legislation and
failing to enact legislation are not equivalent. As a structural matter, though,
Congress’s decision in this example appears indistinguishable from zoning
officials’ decision not to rezone property.
The discussion of the act/omission distinction suggests the contours of
an explanation. The central differences between these two examples are the
extent to which the state is responsible for creating the underlying condi-
tions and also the extent of ongoing control. By adopting comprehensive
zoning, a local government is like the driver of a car who sets it in motion
down a hill. Where such conduct creates conditions that expose property to
a sufficient risk of loss, a subsequent failure to act actually amounts, in
Weinrib’s formulation, to pseudo-nonfeasance.148
Admittedly, this analogy assumes a number of important complications.
When is the government like the driver instead of like the car manufacturer,
which (generally) bears no liability when a driver fails to brake?149 Why
doesn’t the existence of banking regulations compel the same analysis when
Congress refuses to write down underwater mortgages? These examples are
not fundamentally different, however. Instead, they occupy different places
on a spectrum that is defined by the nature and extent of the government’s
involvement in establishing the conditions that result in the subsequent loss
of property. Once the government is sufficiently involved, it assumes an ob-
ligation to act when conditions in the world change.
B. Passive Takings Defined
Passive takings should arise when property is subject to such regulatory
control that the government is understood to be responsible for the resulting
harm, whether it acts or not. Or, to put it in affirmative terms, the govern-
ment should have a constitutional duty to act when it is complicit in creat-
ing the conditions that are responsible for harm to property. Passive takings
liability will therefore attach to property that the government substantially
1069 (Kan. 1989) (evaluating a claim based on failure to rezone through traditional regulatory
takings analysis); Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. 1994) (same); cf. Braun
v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 519 F.3d 564, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2008) (subjecting denial of rezon-
ing to Williamson County ripeness analysis).
148. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
149. Sometimes issues of fact can implicate the manufacturer. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi,
1.5 Million Toyotas Recalled for Brake and Fuel Pump Problems, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2010, at
B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/business/global/22toyota.html?_r=0 (dis-
cussing allegations of manufacturing defects that led to braking problems in Toyota cars).
378 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:345
regulates and has consequently rendered especially vulnerable to a change in
the world.
If the government were also responsible for the underlying threat to
property rights—if the government, for example, were responsible for global
warming—then the duty to act would be stronger still. Nevertheless, even in
the absence of that level of responsibility, where the content of state-defined
rights and obligations exposes property to harm, the government should not
necessarily be able to avoid liability by claiming inaction. By defining the
content of property, the government is analogous to the driver who sets the
car in motion. The government cannot later claim that it did not act when
that definition of property comes crashing into some new reality.
There is, of course, a sense in which the government is always entangled
with property, the substantive content of which comes largely, if not en-
tirely, from positive law.150 If that level of entanglement were all that is nec-
essary to create liability, then passive takings claims would be ubiquitous.
The purpose of this Part, however, is not to find the outer bounds of passive
takings liability but instead to identify the core. After all, this Article’s funda-
mental goal is simply to prove the existence of passive takings claims. Future
scholarship can push the limits. At a minimum, then, passive takings claims
should arise when:
1. The state has effective control over the injury-causing condition; or
2. The state has rendered the property especially susceptible to adverse
changes in the world.
Consider these in turn.
As an initial matter, one thing is clear: control must mean something
more than the theoretical ability to have prevented a particular harm. Passive
takings claims do not arise simply because some action was available to the
state that would have minimized or eliminated the loss.151 If your house
burns down, you do not have a passive takings claim because the govern-
ment could have located a fire house closer to your neighborhood. Control,
instead, means that the state has effectively determined the allocation of
costs. This definition is closely analogous to Husak’s control principle as a
basis for criminal liability.152 The intuition, again, is that sufficient control
over a situation can substitute for an explicit act; control imposes an affirm-
ative duty to act.
If this seems too abstract, a stark example comes from the facts of Ar-
kansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States.153 There, the U.S. Army
150. For a discussion of the sources of property law, see, for example, Bloom & Serkin,
supra note 5, at 572–73.
151. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203–04
(1989) (rejecting claim that government has general obligation to act); see also Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 764 (2005) (finding no property interest in temporary re-
straining order).
152. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
153. 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
December 2014] Passive Takings 379
Corps of Engineers managed a dam on the Black River in Arkansas.154 Sev-
eral decades ago, the Army Corps adopted a plan (in the form of a “man-
ual”) for regular releases of water that caused predictable downstream
flooding in short bursts.155 Farmers in recent years objected to those releases
and asked instead for temporary deviations from the manual in order to
produce more sustained and less intense releases.156 The Army Corps agreed
and “released water from the Dam at a slower rate than before, providing
downstream farmers with a longer harvest time.”157 The releases, however,
damaged timber belonging to the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission,
which sued alleging that the deviations from the manual caused a taking of
its property.158 The Supreme Court held that temporary flooding could give
rise to a takings claim and remanded the case for further proceedings.159
For present purposes, the important feature of this case is that the gov-
ernment almost completely controlled the allocation of costs from flood-
ing—imposing costs either on the farmers if it released the water more
quickly over a shorter duration or on the timber owners if it released the
water more slowly over a longer period.160 Presumably, the Army Corps
could have chosen not to release water at all, but such a decision would have
eventually led to a catastrophic breach of the dam and much more damage
for everyone downstream. The Army Corps had the capacity to choose be-
tween each of these three options, and each choice predictably determined
who would bear the burden of the releases. That degree of control renders
nonsensical any attempt to distinguish between acts and omissions in each
of these scenarios.161 Such a level of control is sufficient to create a passive
takings claim.
The other doctrinal hook for passive takings liability exists when the
government has made a piece of property more vulnerable to subsequent
154. Arkansas Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 515–16.
155. Id. at 516.
156. Id. at 516–17.
157. Id. at 516.
158. Id. at 515.
159. Id. at 522–23.
160. This resembles the famous case Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). There, some
cedar trees carried a “red cedar rust” fungus that was harmless to the cedar trees but deadly to
apple trees. Miller, 276 U.S. at 277–78. Faced with the two conflicting uses, the state legislature
defined fungus-carrying cedar trees as a public nuisance, thereby protecting apple trees and
allocating the harm from the fungus to one group of property owners over another. Id. For a
fascinating treatment of the case, see Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property
Rights, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1549, 1635–36 (2003).
161. To the contrary, Professor Byrne argues that, as a doctrinal matter, “when govern-
ment must choose which entities will suffer an unavoidable loss from a natural calamity, it
does not incur takings liability to the loser.” Byrne, supra note 11, at 92. Whether or not this
claim is normatively appealing—discussed infra Part IV—Byrne’s doctrinal case remains un-
persuasive. For support he cites only Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), but that case
stands for the very different proposition that government does not violate the Due Process
Clause in such a situation. In other words, the government is empowered to act in order to
allocate loss. But that says nothing about the possibility of takings liability.
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changes in the world. In the quintessential case, this occurs when the gov-
ernment disables self-help. By removing property owners’ ability to protect
themselves, the government incurs a special obligation to provide protec-
tion, and its failure to do so can trigger passive takings liability.162
One good example is Right-to-Farm legislation. A typical Right-to-Farm
statute immunizes agricultural uses from nuisance lawsuits.163 This amounts
to a kind of disabling protection for affected neighbors, eliminating the cen-
tral private mechanism for neighbors to protect themselves. But the state
should then be subject to some duty to defend the neighbors’ property be-
cause it has eliminated their ability to defend it themselves. Failure to defend
should expose the state to takings liability.
Neighbors have successfully challenged Right-to-Farm statutes on tradi-
tional takings grounds.164 These suits have always involved legislation that,
when enacted, effected a taking. But passive takings recognize the govern-
ment’s ongoing duty to neighbors if conditions in the world change. Imag-
ine, for example, that a state enacts a Right-to-Farm law at a time when a
particular nearby farm is not actually creating a nuisance for its neighbors.
Any immediate harm to the neighbors appears fairly slight—presumably,
the discounted present value of the ability to bring a nuisance action some-
time in the future. The harm almost certainly would not rise to the level of a
taking. But if farming practices or environmental conditions somehow
change in a way that creates a nuisance in the future, the Right-to-Farm
statute’s impact changes dramatically. At that point, the neighbors—or at
least those who were there already when the statute was enacted—should be
able to sue. By disabling private remedies, the state has taken upon itself a
duty to defend neighbors’ property. But that duty is implicated only when
the neighbors’ property requires defending, which may not occur until
162. I thank Lee Fennell for suggesting this precise formulation. Not all courts agree,
however. Most notably, in Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs were
farmers whose sheep were being killed by grizzly bears. The Endangered Species Act prevented
the plaintiffs from killing the bears, effectively disabling at least one form of self-help. Never-
theless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a takings claim, holding that
the regulations did not burden the plaintiffs. Id. at 1335. The Christy court did not formulate
the issue as involving takings through inaction, however, and at least one leading commentator
has written that the case is about causation, not inaction. See Meltz, supra note 17, at 321 n.95.
163. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 106-701(a) (2013) (“No agricultural or forestry
operation or any of its appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any
changed conditions in or about the locality outside of the operation after the operation has
been in operation for more than one year . . . .”). Note that the “changed conditions” antici-
pated by the statute amounts to a codification of the “coming to the nuisance defense”; once a
nonagricultural use is in place, it cannot become a nuisance if people subsequently build
homes nearby. See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 95, 119–22.
This is different from a change in the impact from the agricultural use itself.
164. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998); see also Tiffany Dowell,
Understanding and Interpreting Right to Farm Laws, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Summer 2011,
at 39; Lynda J. Oswald, At the Intersection of Environmental Law and Nuisance Law: Do Right-
to-Farm Statutes Result in Regulatory Takings?, 30 Real Est. L.J. 69 (2001).
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sometime in the future. The state’s failure to defend after disabling self-help,
not the original enactment of the statute itself, triggers takings liability.165
A similar analysis applies to landlords’ remedies for tenants in breach.
Most states today prohibit landlords from using self-help when their tenants
illegally remain in possession of property.166 Landlords are not allowed to
lock their tenants out but must instead rely on eviction procedures culmi-
nating in public enforcement by a law-enforcement officer.167 If a landlord
secures a judgment of eviction and the relevant law-enforcement authority
fails to enforce it, the landlord should be able to sue for a taking of property.
In this scenario, the state is tacitly allowing the holdover tenant to stay.168
This claim is both straightforward and surprising. As DeShaney makes
clear, the police are not generally obligated to protect people or their prop-
erty.169 A bank or bodega owner cannot recover from the police for a bur-
glary that the police failed to stop. In general, a person cannot sue the police
for failing to stop trespassers.170 But a different situation suddenly arises
once the state has disabled self-help. The state has thereby assumed a duty to
protect, and the Takings Clause may then obligate the government to act.
Comprehensive land-use controls provide another example when they
render property especially susceptible to subsequent harm and prevent own-
ers from adjusting to ecological changes. Zoning regulations typically limit
the size, shape, and use of property.171 While some of these restrictions may
occasionally go too far, most survive constitutional scrutiny.172 But they may
also render property especially susceptible to subsequent harm if changed
conditions alter the land-use controls’ impact. Imagine, for example, that
165. This does not eliminate traditional nuisance factors, like “coming to the nuisance.”
The neighbor must have had a colorable (valuable) nuisance claim that the Right-to-Farm
legislation prevented. In the absence of such a claim, there could be no taking. This reality
forestalls the objection that neighboring property owners could suddenly ignore the existence
of a nearby farm in making their investment decisions. For a more general discussion of this
issue, see infra Section III.C.2 (discussing moral hazard).
166. See, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978).
167. See, e.g., id.
168. This could be a Loretto-style taking, through a permanent physical occupation. See
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Of course, the landlord
may also have a nonconstitutional mandamus action, but the two are not mutually exclusive.
Courts have not been particularly receptive to the background notion that tenant-protecting
statutes can give rise to takings claims. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
Rent regulation is different, however, from a sheriff’s refusing to enforce an eviction order.
169. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
170. Cf. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Excep-
tionalism, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 391, 457 (2008) (“Nor does the fact that an individual police
officer is not under a constitutional duty to help a property owner eject a trespasser from her
land mean that having a legal system of property protection is discretionary.”).
171. New York City’s zoning code is famously complex, with height-based limits, setbacks,
floor-area ratios, sky-plan exposures, and well over 150 different use districts. See, e.g., Robert
C. Ellickson et al., Land Use Controls 61 (4th ed. 2013).
172. See, e.g., Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 2005); Mayhew v.
Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998); Rowlett/2000, Ltd. v. City of Rowlett, 231
S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App. 2007).
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someone owns property zoned exclusively for residential use. That property
is located near a small airport. If an airport expansion dramatically increases
noise, rendering the property unsuitable for homes, passive takings might
force the government to change the zoning designation or pay compensa-
tion. In this example, the preexisting single-family zoning designation ren-
dered the property especially susceptible to the subsequent harm by
constraining the use and form that the development could take. And, in-
deed, some courts have recognized property owners’ entitlement to a zoning
change in that kind of situation.173 Although not generally viewed as an ex-
ample of omissions liability, zoning law in some states includes a “changed-
conditions” doctrine, which obligates a local government to alter zoning
limits if changes in local conditions render the limits obsolete.174
To summarize, passive takings impose a basis for liability where the state
controls the allocation of costs and benefits and therefore controls the impo-
sition of harm, or where the government has rendered property especially
vulnerable to changes in the world (for example, by disabling self-help).
These conditions often overlap, of course.
***
Even where one of the conditions for passive takings exists, the impact
of the government’s failure to act must still rise to the level of a taking under
traditional takings tests before the government is actually liable. Applying
Penn Central, for example, the governmental inaction must result in a signif-
icant diminution in the value of the property and substantially interfere with
the owner’s investment-backed expectations.175 Conventionally, the Penn
Central inquiry requires comparing the pre- and postregulation value of the
property to determine a regulation’s effect on the property’s fair-market
value. The same basic approach applies to passive takings as well, where the
extent of a state’s failure to act can be assessed by comparing the current
value of the property with the value it would have had if the state had acted.
Applying Penn Central in this way generates an immediate and impor-
tant limit on passive takings liability: to be liable for a passive taking, the
government must have had the ability to protect the property at issue. Oth-
erwise, there is no diminution in value resulting from the government’s in-
action. Even if the other conditions for passive takings liability are met, no
173. See, e.g., Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.
1999) (“Under Illinois law, a change in the nature of the surrounding land uses may compel a
municipality to grant an application for rezoning or a special use permit.”); Burritt v. Harris,
172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
174. See, e.g., Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1941) (“[W]hen
property, restricted to a defined use by a zoning ordinance, changes its physical character from
natural causes to the extent that it is no longer adaptable to the use it is zoned for, then it
becomes the duty of the zoning board to relax its restrictions to prevent confiscation just as
much so as in the case where the regulation was invalid in the first instance.”); sources cited
supra note 173.
175. See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Meltz, supra
note 17 (describing the application of the test).
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harm exists unless the government could have protected the property at is-
sue, and there is no liability unless the extent of the harm violates Penn
Central (or one of the Takings Clause’s per-se rules).176
Consider—as a stylized example—a house destroyed by a fire that
spread from an abutting national park. To establish a passive takings claim,
based perhaps on the forestry service’s failure to promote controlled burns
in the area, the property owner would have to show that a different forestry
strategy would have substantially reduced the expected value of her loss. The
difference in the risk of loss due to fire under the two approaches would
have to rise to the level of a taking. In other words, the fact that different
forestry practices might have reduced the expected loss to some extent does
not suffice to establish passive takings liability; that difference still must rise
to the level of a taking under traditional takings jurisprudence.177
This example’s analysis glosses over an additional complexity, however.
It assumes that the forestry service was choosing between two distinct for-
estry practices. In fact, the range of options that the forestry service did not
adopt is infinite. Fortunately, the range of relevant counterfactuals for pas-
sive takings analysis is not. The relevant omissions for purposes of evaluat-
ing passive takings include only those forgone actions that would have been
consistent with other constitutional limitations. For example, the forestry
service could not have acted in ways that violated due process, equal protec-
tion, or any other constitutional limit.178 The government cannot be liable
under the Takings Clause for failing to do what it is not empowered or able
to do.179
The due process limit, in particular, serves a central role in delimiting a
principled and workable sphere for passive takings liability. Broadly speak-
ing, the Due Process Clause prevents the government from acting in ways
that are arbitrary or irrational, which fundamentally means acting in ways
that do more harm than good.180 The government cannot act—and so can-
not reasonably be expected to act—in ways that are socially harmful. This
fact is inherent in the nature of governmental power. To return to the forest-
fire hypothetical, the homeowner cannot claim that the forestry service took
her property because it failed to clearcut the forest to prevent fires from
starting in the first place. She must show that the comparator—the action
that the government could have taken but did not—would have been within
the range of appropriate governmental actions and specifically that it would
176. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (describing bases for
takings liability).
177. This argument remains agnostic about the substantive content of takings liability.
The point is simply that such liability applies symmetrically to active and passive takings.
178. Notably, a federal agency could not, of course, exceed its authority under the Com-
merce Clause.
179. This bears a close relationship to Michelman’s insight that takings analysis only pro-
ceeds in the face of an otherwise permissible governmental action. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 84–91 (discussing Michelman).
180. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928); see also Ellickson et
al., supra note 171, at 102–04 (describing due process review).
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have been socially beneficial. As with traditional due process analysis, the
government should be entitled to substantial deference in delimiting forgone
actions that would have been arbitrary or irrational. Because of that defer-
ence, a court is not deciding in the abstract whether clearcutting a forest—
in the example above—is or is not net beneficial. Instead, a court must sim-
ply decide whether the government’s judgment on the question satisfies the
relevant standard of review.
This limitation makes for an interesting symmetry in litigation. Typi-
cally, the government argues that its actions are rational and nonarbitrary.181
For passive takings, by contrast, it is the property owner arguing that for-
gone governmental actions would have also been net beneficial, while the
government claims that the actions would not have been. And just as the
government receives tremendous deference in weighing the costs and bene-
fits of its actions, that deference is appropriate here. But such deference does
not amount to abdication of oversight in the context of either action or
inaction. Despite the considerable deference under rational basis review,
courts do, in fact, invalidate governmental actions that they find produce
more harm than benefits.182 This analysis is familiar to courts and commen-
tators and extends beyond the passive takings context.
To summarize, then, a passive takings claim requires the property owner
first to show that the government had a duty to act based on the state’s
control over the property or based on its role in rendering the property
more susceptible to harm. The property owner must then identify actions
that the government could have taken that both would have been within the
universe of appropriate governmental actions and would have substantially
protected the property rights at issue. The government deserves substantial
deference in determining that certain forgone actions would have been im-
permissible and therefore should not serve as a basis of comparison for pas-
sive takings purposes. Finally, the property owner must show that the effect
of the government’s inaction rose to the level of a taking. Or, to put it differ-
ently, the owner must show that the forgone action would have protected
the property to such an extent that the resulting difference in value between
the action and inaction satisfies the standard for takings liability (whether
under Penn Central or one of the per-se rules). Specifying plaintiffs’ burdens
in this way demonstrates that passive takings are a heavy lift, but not an
impossible one. This formulation also provides some reassurance that pas-
sive takings liability will not bankrupt the state treasury.
181. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468 (7th Cir.
1988) (upholding zoning ordinance as rational); Cormier v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1984) (same); see also Robert J. Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in
American Land-Use Law: A Substitute for Analysis, a Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 301 (1996) (reviewing due process analysis).
182. See, e.g., Twigg v. Cnty. of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (invalidating
application of zoning ordinance).
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C. Limitations and Counterarguments
Having set out the normative justifications and doctrinal bases for pas-
sive takings, some objections come immediately to mind. From the most
specific to the most general, the objections include: (1) concern about invad-
ing a protected space for governmental decisionmaking; (2) the possibility
that passive takings liability will lead to moral hazard in property owners’
investment decisions; and (3) the effect on governments’ willingness to reg-
ulate in the first place. These are considered in order.
1. Infringing Authority over Priorities—Invading
“Prosecutorial Discretion”
A general concern related to passive takings liability is that it will give
courts an inappropriate role in setting governmental policies and priorities.
Holding a government liable for actions that it did not take resembles a
usurpation of legislative or executive authority. In the administrative con-
text, the Supreme Court famously viewed this concern through the lens of
prosecutorial discretion.183 Despite occasional APA review of regulatory in-
action, courts have largely resisted compelling governmental action, worry-
ing, for example, that reviewing inaction “would mean that it would
ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the agency,
to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the
judge into day-to-day agency management.”184 The Supreme Court has
therefore confined judicial review of agency inaction to the very narrow
claim in which the “plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete
agency action that it is required to take.”185
Passive takings are critically different from the APA’s judicial review of
agency inaction for two reasons, however. First, the presumptive remedy for
passive takings is damages instead of mandamus or injunctive relief.186 As a
result, courts will not be forcing the government to act but only to compen-
sate for the consequences of its inaction. The ultimate decision whether to
183. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see also Bressman, supra note
121, at 1694 (describing the connection between administrative review and prosecutorial
discretion).
184. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66–67 (2004). But see supra notes
121–129 and accompanying text (discussing limited judicial review of agency inaction under
the APA).
185. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in original); see also Biber, supra note 125, at 8–9
(“Case law has generally only allowed private parties to force agencies to act where the agency
has some sort of ‘clear’ or ‘nondiscretionary’ duty to do so. In contrast, judicial review of an
agency action is possible even where an agency has broad discretion in how or whether to
act . . . .” (citation omitted)).
186. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Ange-
les, 482 U.S. 304, 321–22 (1987). But see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2607 (2010) (“[Compensation] is even rare for a legislative or
executive taking, and we see no reason why it would be the exclusive remedy for a judicial
taking.”).
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act remains squarely with the relevant governmental decisionmakers. This
should make passive takings much more palatable to courts, both because
courts would be infringing less on other branches’ autonomy and because
assessing liability and damages falls firmly within their core competencies.
True, courts would still be allocating the state’s scarce financial resources—
or at least giving the state the choice between acting and paying—but courts
routinely play this role.187 Indeed, there are many contexts—both constitu-
tional and otherwise—in which courts already compel the state to allocate
resources in particular ways.188
Passive takings are also different from APA review of agency inaction
because they squarely pit two constitutional principles against each other. In
their APA review, courts often highlight the conflict between the APA’s stat-
utory authorization for review of agency inaction on the one hand and the
constitutional principle of prosecutorial discretion on the other.189 In that
context, the constitutional principle, which is based on constitutional struc-
ture, necessarily trumps. The result is extremely deferential—if not ane-
mic—judicial review. Passive takings, by contrast, introduce a constitutional
principle on the other side of the equation, and the Fifth Amendment’s pro-
tection of private property serves as a hefty counterweight to structural sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns and prosecutorial discretion.190
Moreover, related concerns about omissions liability in the private
sphere do not apply where the defendant is the state. One of the central
objections to imposing a duty to act—a duty to rescue in tort law, for exam-
ple—involves concerns about the putative duty holder’s liberty.191 The gov-
ernment’s liberty, however, does not need protecting—at least not in the
same way. To be sure, if the Takings Clause imposes affirmative obligations,
individual state actors may be compelled to assume certain responsibilities
that they might prefer not to have. But such a result is not morally objec-
tionable. Indeed, state actors—whether police officers or public-utility
workers—already operate under specific duties to act where the underlying
harm falls within the ambit of their responsibilities.192 One of the central
187. See Bloom & Serkin, supra note 5, at 589 (“In educational reform litigation, tort
claims against government actors, and even traditional regulatory takings litigation, state court
rulings already impose significant financial liability on the government.”).
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); see also Biber, supra note 121, at
485–86 (discussing Heckler); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administra-
tive Law, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 689, 710–13 (1990) (same).
190. I thank Lisa Bressman for suggesting this point.
191. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 198 (1973);
Weinrib, supra note 8, at 268–69; see also Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The
Case of Required Rescue, 89 Geo. L.J. 605, 606 (2001) (“The main argument in defense of the
traditional view . . . has been that positive legal duties threaten the common law’s traditional
deference to individual liberty.”). Professor Murphy ultimately rejects this view.
192. See, e.g., Williams v. Carolina & Nw. R.R. Co., 57 S.E. 216 (N.C. 1907); O’Rourke v.
Schact, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 53 (Can. 1974).
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moral objections to omissions liability therefore does not apply in the tak-
ings context.
2. Moral Hazard
A more persuasive counterargument is the worry that passive takings
liability will create a moral-hazard problem. Such liability seems to make the
government the insurer of last resort when the world changes in unexpected
ways. Individuals who might naturally be wary of buying beachfront prop-
erty, for example, may become more willing to do so if they can expect the
government to cover some of the costs associated with sea-level rise. Passive
takings liability might therefore encourage overinvesting in private property
that is most susceptible to ecological change.
This amounts to a serious objection, to be sure, but it is not unique to
passive takings. A sophisticated objection to traditional affirmative takings—
including eminent domain—is that property owners will ignore regulatory
risks that they should, in fact, internalize.193 Here, the objection is parallel:
people will inefficiently ignore the risks of regulatory inaction. At a funda-
mental level, the moral-hazard concern is not conceptually distinct for pas-
sive and active takings.
In addition, because passive takings are defined narrowly, they do not
offer the possibility of compensation for all or even most ecological harms.
Most importantly, passive takings do not allow property owners to ignore
freestanding risks of ecological change. Passive takings claims arise only
when the government has incurred some duty to act—a duty based on its
preexisting involvement with the property. In that context, the moral-hazard
problem still exists, but it actually applies narrowly. The Takings Clause will
not offer compensation for floods or fires unless the state had a duty to act
because of its prior regulatory intervention. And where the state does, in
fact, have such a duty, it is reasonable and appropriate for property owners
to make their investment decisions with an expectation of that action.194
It is true that the possibility of compensation may, on the margins, in-
duce risk-neutral property owners to overinvest in property subject to some
risk of regulatory action or inaction. But just as the moral-hazard phenome-
non has not led to a broad disavowal of affirmative takings liability, it does
not undermine the possibility of passive takings either. The marginal effect
of such liability on property owners’ investment incentives appears minor
indeed: its magnitude is defined by the expected value of a passive takings
claim, which will usually be quite small because of the challenges of bringing
a successful claim. And at the very least, there is no reason for the moral-
193. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 618; Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity
Revisited, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1836–37 (1985); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 531.
194. Cf. Leavens, supra note 133, at 573 (“Once we realize that a particular undesirable
state of affairs can be avoided by taking certain precautions, we usually incorporate these
precautions into what we see as the normal or at rest state of affairs. A failure to engage in the
preventive conduct in these cases can thus be seen as an intervention that disturbs the status
quo.”).
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hazard objection to apply with more force to passive takings than for tradi-
tional ones.
3. Inducing Inaction
A final concern lies in the long-term effects of passive takings liability
on governments’ regulatory incentives. As defined in this Part, passive tak-
ings liability involves inaction following some earlier action. It does not cre-
ate freestanding liability for changes in the world but requires a prior
governmental entanglement with the harm-generating ecological change.
The problem, then, is that this new threat of liability might induce govern-
ments to avoid acting in the first place in order to forestall the passive tak-
ings claims that could follow.
Conceptually, this is a compelling worry. But in fact it has little real-
world bite. First, and most practically, the pervasiveness of extant regulation
means that inaction at this point is simply not an option. With a blank slate
and no history of governmental activity, this might be a more serious con-
cern. But considering the world as it exists today, the government cannot
extricate itself from its comprehensive regulatory control over so many
forms of private property.
This response is not a complete answer, however, because the concern
remains that the threat of passive takings will induce relatively less regula-
tory activity going forward (bearing in mind, of course, that some people will
consider this a feature and not a bug of the proposal). It is a real stretch to
think that governmental actors today will be motivated to avoid enacting
regulations that might give rise to passive takings claims in the event of some
future ecological change. As a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine this
concern affecting regulatory incentives in any meaningful way. Governmen-
tal decisions are the product of so many immediate pressures that the ab-
stract fear of creating the conditions for passive takings liability in the
distant future is unlikely to deter the government from regulating.195 Moving
away from abstract theory and examining how a passive takings claim might
look in the real world drives this point home.
IV. Examples of Passive Takings
The first three Parts of this Article have set out the normative and doc-
trinal case for passive takings. But what would such claims look like in the
real world? Outside the realm of abstract property theory, how would pas-
sive takings claims actually work? Sea-level rise provides an ideal illustration.
This Part therefore begins by identifying some possible passive takings
claims resulting from sea-level rise. It then provides a normative defense of
extending passive takings liability in these specific contexts. Finally, the Part
concludes by speculating about some other examples.
195. See supra note 62 (citing public-choice literature).
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A. Passive Takings from Sea-Level Rise
The climate is changing. Seas are rising, and coastal storm surge is an
increasingly serious threat.196 Measuring and predicting the extent of sea-
level rise in any specific location remain enormously complex. Scientists
continue to evaluate the macro systems involved, which contain many vari-
ables, from thermal expansion and glacial melt to the rate of future carbon
emissions.197 Mainstream acceptance of the phenomenon is very recent, and
scientific predictions are being rapidly updated as the science evolves.198
The scientific community continues to revise upward its estimates of
sea-level rise. Credible models predict an increase in mean sea levels between
approximately two and five feet (or higher) by the year 2100.199 The actual
impacts of sea-level rise will vary tremendously by location, however.200 For
example, a two-foot increase in median sea level—the low end of current
estimates over the next century—will likely leave significant portions of
Florida and the Gulf Coast underwater.201 The increase in mean sea level will
196. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Managing the Risks
of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation 178 (2012)
[hereinafter IPCC Managing Risks of Extreme Events], available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/
SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf.
197. See, e.g., id. at 179 (“[An earlier report] projected sea level rise for 2090–2099 relative
to 1980–1999 due to ocean thermal expansion, glaciers and ice caps, and modeled ice sheet
contributions of 18 to 59 cm, which incorporates a 90% uncertainty range across all scenarios.
An additional contribution to the sea level rise projections was taken into account for a possi-
ble rapid dynamic response of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, which could result
in an accelerating contribution to sea level rise.” (citing Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, Fourth Assessment Report (2007) [hereinafter AR4], available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_
report.htm)).
198. See, e.g., Jeremy L. Weiss et al., Letter, Implications of Recent Sea Level Rise Science for
Low-Elevation Areas in Coastal Cities of the Coterminous U.S.A., 105 Climatic Change 635,
636 (2011).
199. See Herzog & Hecht, supra note 10, at 464 (“Research projects sea levels on the
Southern California coast will rise five to twenty-four inches above 2000 levels by 2050.”).
Compare AR4, supra note 197, at 8, with IPCC Managing Risks of Extreme Events, supra
note 196, at 179 (citing recent studies).
200. IPCC Managing Risks of Extreme Events, supra note 196, at 183 (“The suscepti-
bility of coastal regions to erosion and inundation is related to various physical (e.g., shoreline
slope), and geomorphological and ecosystem attributes . . . .”). For interactive maps demon-
strating this variation, see Sea Level Trends, NOAA Tides & Currents, http://tidesandcurrents
.noaa.gov/sltrends/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). See also Caldwell & Segall, supra
note 10, at 537 (describing variables impacting local effects of sea-level rise).
201. See Weiss et al., supra note 198, at 639–41; see also Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R.
Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Cli-
mate, 30 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 51, 54 (2011) (reporting that one meter of sea-level rise will “lead
to the loss of up to 10,000 square miles of coastal land in the United States”); Titus, supra note
10, at 1284–85 (reporting that a four-foot rise “would inundate 7000 square miles of dry land
in the contiguous United States—an area the size of Massachusetts”). For interactive maps, see
Sea Level Impact Map, DSEGL: ClimateGEM, http://climategem.geo.arizona.edu/slr/us48prvi/
index.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
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also exacerbate the impact of storm surge, leading to flooding and inunda-
tion.202 Hurricane Sandy vividly demonstrated the potential dangers of in-
creased storm surge when it devastated New York City in 2012.
The purpose of this argument, however, is neither to review the scien-
tific evidence supporting sea-level rise nor to make informed predictions
about its likely consequences. This discussion therefore assumes that sea
levels are indeed rising. Further, it assumes that sea-level rise increases
coastal erosion and flooding, both of which will detrimentally impact some
formerly developed (or developable) property. Such erosion and flooding
might give rise to a variety of passive takings claims.
Under the test set out in Part III, a passive takings claim requires a
property owner to show first that the government is complicit in creating
the conditions that are responsible for the harm. Second, the property
owner must prove that the inaction violated the Penn Central test (or some
other basis for traditional takings liability), which requires identifying per-
missible actions that the government could have taken to avoid the harm.
How, then, might the government be complicit in creating the harm
resulting from sea-level rise?203 Recall from Part III that passive takings lia-
bility depends on the extent of the government’s responsibility for the con-
ditions that expose property owners to harm. As a general matter, few
geographical areas are subject to as many regulations as coastal property.
Overlapping federal, state, and local land-use and environmental regula-
tions, which are overseen and enforced by diverse agencies and legislative
bodies, embed coastal property in a complex and detailed web of govern-
mental control. A brief overview makes the point clear.
The federal Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”)204 provides
grants to states to develop and administer coastal-management plans that
satisfy federal requirements.205 States that accept the grants must adopt state
202. See, e.g., Caldwell & Segall, supra note 10, at 538 (“Because the nearshore wave height
varies directly with water depth and wave energy varies with the square of wave height, accel-
erating sea level rise will strongly increase the force of breaking waves in newly deepened near-
shore waters . . . .”).
203. Of course, the government may be complicit because it contributes to carbon emis-
sions, in part by adopting a permissive regulatory stance. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis 17–19, 27–29
(2013), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL
.pdf (concluding that human activity has been the dominant cause of global warming since the
mid-twentieth century and explaining that global mean surface temperature increases as a
function of global carbon emissions); J. Imbers et al., Testing the Robustness of the Anthropo-
genic Climate Change Detection Statements Using Different Empirical Models, 118 J. Geophysi-
cal Res.: Atmospheres 3192, 3198 (2013) (validating the detection and attribution of human
contributions to climate change). That overarching claim implicates questions of proof and
causation that go beyond the scope and purpose of this Article.
204. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2012). For a discussion of the Act, see generally Robert G.
Healy & Jeffrey A. Zinn, Environment and Development Conflicts in Coastal Zone Management,
51 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 299, 300 (1985).
205. 16 U.S.C. § 1455. Each state’s coastal-management plan must, at a minimum, iden-
tify coastal boundaries, define the permissible land and water uses that impact coastal waters,
designate areas of significant concern, identify the legal authority to exert control over coastal
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laws that, in turn, direct counties or local governments to develop their own
coastal-management plans in compliance with both state and federal law (or
demonstrate that local plans already meet the federal requirements).206
County and municipal plans are typically codified in a comprehensive plan
that makes specific provisions for coastal property.207 In addition, local
building codes typically include design requirements for coastal property,
sometimes requiring property to be elevated on piles or stilts or mandating
that building systems be placed on the top—rather than the bottom—of
buildings.208 As these examples demonstrate, the restrictions on coastal
property are detailed indeed.209
Many of these regulations are designed to protect public resources and
to minimize the risk of damage from storms and erosion. Nevertheless, this
comprehensive regulation of coastal property makes it difficult, in general,
for a government—whether federal, state, or local—to claim “inaction”
when ecological change threatens property in ways that the regulations exac-
erbate, even if the regulatory environment is static. This is most obvious in
two specific contexts: zoning height limits and restrictions on beachfront
armoring, although it is true in other regulatory settings as well. The doctri-
nal bases for these two claims appear below, followed, in Section IV.B, by an
evaluation of the desirability of extending liability in this way.
1. Height Limits on Beachfront Property
Zoning routinely imposes strict building-height limits. Beachfront prop-
erty is no exception. The actual height limits of course vary between states,
between municipalities within a state, and between zoning districts within a
municipality. In some places, single-family zones on the coast may have
land and water uses, create broad guidelines to prioritize coastal land uses, describe the organi-
zational structure to be used to implement the state plan, define a planning process to protect
public beaches and access to same, create a planning process for siting energy facilities in
coastal areas, and design a planning process for studying and controlling shoreline erosion.
206. See, e.g., Coastal Area Management Act of 1974, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 113A-108
(2013) (requiring that “[a]ll local land-use plans adopted pursuant to this Article within the
coastal area . . . be consistent with the State guidelines”). For purposes of this discussion,
examples of state and local laws are randomly drawn from the town of Beaufort, North Caro-
lina, simply to illustrate how the regulations overlap.
207. The resulting plans are often detailed and technical documents, specifying appropri-
ate development given different properties’ soil conditions and environmental sensitivities. See,
e.g., Town of Beaufort, N.C., Core Land Use Plan (2006), available at http://portal.ncdenr
.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=1b2ac524-be18-4c8b-967b-57a5328a2ead&groupId=38
319; Herzog & Hecht, supra note 10, at 501 (describing local coastal program of Carlsbad,
California).
208. See, e.g., Int’l Residential Code § R322.1.6 (2012).
209. Federal and state environmental regulations also often apply, requiring owners of
coastal property to seek state permits for any development that may have an impact on coastal
lands, water, or resources. Furthermore, the Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of
dredged or fill material into U.S. waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). And other regulatory
regimes—like historic preservation or the Endangered Species Act—may also impact coastal
property.
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height limits of thirty or thirty-five feet—enough for a three-story house—
while others may have limits that are much lower, even as low as eighteen
feet—enough to permit only a one- or one-and-a-half-story cottage.210 The
purposes of these limits, especially the low limits, are to preserve neighbor-
hood character and ocean views.211 And, when enacted, such height limits
are usually unremarkable and constitutionally unproblematic. Zoning re-
strictions like these are routinely upheld either because of their modest im-
pact on property rights or under a theory of “average reciprocity of
advantage.”212 Yes, the zoning ordinance limits buildable height on some-
one’s property, but it also limits buildable height on her neighbors’ prop-
erty, which confers an offsetting benefit. The resulting net impact therefore
rarely rises to the level of a taking.
Sea-level rise, however, changes the effect of the height limits. The
threats of increased storm surge and sea-level rise have increasingly led
beachfront property owners to elevate their homes on piles or stilts in order
to lift their homes above the level of likely floodwaters.213 Unfortunately for
these owners, height limits are measured from the ground, not from the
lowest livable ground floor. If a property owner must raise her house seven
or ten or even fifteen feet off the ground to avoid flooding and increased
storm surge, there may not be enough height left in the zoning ordinance to
permit any building, much less a building consistent with the owner’s in-
vestment-backed expectations.214
210. Compare Beaufort, N.C., Land Development Ordinance § 7(D)(3) (Nov. 4, 2013)
(permitting 35’ height), with Seattle, Wash., Municipal Code, ch. 23.45, § 514 (2014) (im-
posing 18’ height limits for lowrise developments), and Seattle, Wash., Municipal Code
Zoning Map 218 (2005) (showing lowrise designation for certain oceanfront property).
211. One blog, seeking to raise political opposition in 2010 to relaxed height restrictions,
characterized the successful height limits in place since 1989 as follows: “By preventing new
buildings from towering over their neighbors, these limits also preserved sunlight, tree cano-
pies, green space, and most importantly, neighborhood character.” The Petition to Save Our
Neighborhoods, Seattle Speaks Up, http://seattlespeaksup.wordpress.com/the-petition/ (last
visited Aug. 18, 2014).
212. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Kavanau v. Santa Monica
Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997); K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 705
N.W.2d 365 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
213. Candace Jackson, Built on Stilts: Homes Reach New Heights to Defy High Wind and
Waves, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 2013, at M1.
214. This dynamic is reinforced by the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”). In
areas designated Zone V (for risk of high-velocity wave action), the NFIP’s standards require
the ground floor of buildings to be elevated at, or in some cases two feet above, the Base Flood
Elevation (“BFE”), which is the anticipated level of a 100-year flood. See FEMA, NFIP Flood-
plain Management Guidebook 5–6, 23 (5th ed. 2009), available at http://www.fema.gov/
media-library-data/20130726-1647-20490-1041/nfipguidebook_5edition_web.pdf. See gener-
ally FEMA, Technical Fact Sheet No. 1.6, Designing for Flood Levels Above the BFE
(2010), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1537-20490-8057/fema
499_1_6_rev.pdf (recommending design methods to avoid flooding). The Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency
to incorporate projections of future sea-level rise into its rate maps. Biggert-Waters Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100215, 126 Stat. 916, 926 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 4101a(d)(1)–(2) (2012)). For further discussion of the statutory change, see J.
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Notice the dynamic at work. The law in this situation has not changed.
The height limits in any particular jurisdiction may have been in place for
half a century or longer. But sea-level rise has made flooding more likely.
Elevating structures above the anticipated flood levels may be necessary to
make the property developable (the abandonment option is considered be-
low).215 At least where there are no other available responses to sea-level rise
because of the conditions on a specific lot, static height limits can function
as a kind of prohibition on self-help (in the form of elevating the building)
and could therefore create a passive takings claim.
This does not mean, however, that the government is necessarily liable.
An individual property owner must still demonstrate, under Penn Central,
that permissible actions available to the government would have protected
her property and that the resulting difference in value rises to the level of a
taking.216 Here, there are two challenges facing property owners.
First, it must be the case that the property would have remained devel-
opable in the absence of the background regulations. If the risk of flooding
and inundation threatens all buildings of any height, the height limit will
impose little harm; the property would not have been developable regardless
of the height limits. Or, more formally, the difference between the value of
the property with and without the height limit does not rise to the level of a
taking.
Second—and relatedly—the effect of the government’s refusal to relax
height limits must constitute a taking. Where a zoning ordinance imposes a
height limit of thirty-five feet and six-foot stilts are all that is needed to
avoid flooding, there may be no taking at all. True, the property owner now
cannot build the three-story house she intended, but she can still probably
fit two stories into the remaining twenty-nine feet of buildable height. Al-
though the reduction from a three-story to a two-story building may dimin-
ish value and interfere with expectations, it is unlikely to violate the Takings
Clause.217 But if height limits had been set lower or if the elevation require-
ments were much higher, the impact on a site’s development potential might
be much more dramatic, and it might indeed rise to the level of a taking.
Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in The Law of Adaptation to Cli-
mate Change: U.S. and International Aspects 267, 292 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina
Fischer Kuh eds., 2012).
215. See infra text accompanying note 241.
216. See supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 135 (Ct. App.
2006) (“Like most land use regulations, the ordinance may have ‘the inevitable effect of reduc-
ing the value of regulated properties,’ but even a ‘significant diminution in value is insufficient
to establish a confiscatory taking.’ ” (quoting Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 223
Cal. Rptr. 379, 391 (Ct. App. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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2. Armoring
Another way in which sea-level rise may generate passive takings claims
involves armoring. “Armoring” refers to erecting hard barriers like bulk-
heads, sea walls, and revetments to provide structural protection against
waves and storm surge.218 These forms of hard armoring—as distinguished
from soft armoring like increasing vegetation or wetlands—are controver-
sial. First, they can clutter a beach or oceanfront area, restricting public ac-
cess and interfering with the scenic beauty of a beach or coastal location.219
Hard armoring is also controversial because the protection it affords to the
landward property owner typically comes with costs: increased erosion to
adjacent property and other ecological damage.220 For these reasons, some
state and local governments have long prohibited sea walls and other imper-
meable barriers on parts of the coast.221 Other times, however, the govern-
ment encourages sea walls and even builds them itself.222
Either choice potentially implicates passive takings liability. A ban on
hard armoring looks like a prohibition on self-help. But more generally,
choosing whether to armor or prohibit armoring is closely analogous to the
situation in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, where the
allocation of costs is entirely within the government’s control.223 The harm
from sea-level rise will occur, and the only question is who will bear it.
Constitutional liability should not then depend on whether the govern-
ment’s decision is characterized as an act or an omission.224 Whether the
government prohibits or builds sea walls, its near-total control over the allo-
cation of the inevitable harm serves as a doctrinal hook for passive takings
liability.
218. See, e.g., Grannis, supra note 26, at 36 (describing hard armoring); Byrne, supra
note 11, at 86–93 (same).
219. See, e.g., Caldwell & Segall, supra note 10, at 540 (describing costs).
220. As Byrne explains, armoring “often increases erosion of neighboring properties by
increasing current and wave action laterally against unprotected shorelines.” Byrne, supra note
11, at 87; see also Caldwell & Segall, supra note 10, at 534 (“[Sea walls] will have significant
social and ecological costs. Beaches below the walls may be eroded away, or the thin ribbon of
sand remaining will be blocked from the public by massive shoreline protection structures.
Where estuarine marshes . . . are threatened . . . coastal armoring will prevent marsh migra-
tion, leading to the eventual loss of ecosystem function.”); Herzog & Hecht, supra note 10, at
473–75 (discussing armoring strategies and costs). For a terrific exploration of the land-use
consequences of such erosion and accretion, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill,
Contested Shore: Property Rights in Reclaimed Land and the Battle for Streeterville, 107 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1057 (2013).
221. See sources cited supra note 25; see also Herzog & Hecht, supra note 10, at 9, 38–42
(listing Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Texas as states that have banned or severely restricted hard armoring and discussing the politi-
cal and legal dynamics of prohibiting armoring).
222. See infra text accompanying notes 232–235.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 153–160.
224. Byrne implicitly disagrees. See Byrne, supra note 11, at 101 (arguing that prohibitions
on armoring are unlikely to affect takings because “future losses to the owner will be accom-
plished by nature, not by government”).
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The effect of the government’s decision, however, must still rise to the
level of a taking under Penn Central, and meeting that threshold proves
complicated in both contexts.225 Consider, first, a prohibition on hard
armoring. While in some circumstances a sea wall might provide the strong-
est protection against storm surge and tides, there may well be practical and
effective alternatives like soft armoring that would also protect the property.
Where those options are available, a ban on hard armoring has not actually
disabled self-help or determined the allocation of costs. It has, at most, lim-
ited the forms of self-help available. And whether that rises to the level of a
taking depends on the efficacy and cost associated with the alternatives. For
example, a developer prohibited from erecting a sea wall might nevertheless
be able to build a new house elevated on stilts, although presumably at
greater cost or lesser benefit.226 In this way, it is the extent of the difference
in value between the prohibited favored approach (the sea wall) and the still-
available second-best approach (stilts) that serves as the basis for the takings
analysis. If the second-best option represents an adequate alternative—if it
neither reduces the value of property too much nor interferes too intrusively
with the property owner’s expectations—then there will be no taking.227
Moreover, if sea-level rise would have overcome even the strongest hard
armoring, then there is no taking. But the property owner must show more
than that some theoretical engineering marvel could have saved her prop-
erty. She must show that the particular alternative would have been finan-
cially plausible considering the property. A property owner cannot complain
about a prohibition on hard armoring if the least expensive option would
have cost $5 million to protect a $100,000 bungalow. To put it more for-
mally, the impact of the governmental regulation does not rise to the level of
a taking if it prohibits an activity or use of the property that would not, in
fact, fall within reasonable expectations. This is not to deny the possibility
that someone, for idiosyncratic reasons, might be willing to invest millions
of dollars to save a structure worth only a fraction of that amount. But the
Takings Clause, even in its traditional form, does not protect expectations
that are objectively unreasonable.228 The rule for passive takings should not
be any different.
225. Some courts have indeed rejected traditional takings challenges to newly enacted
prohibitions on hard armoring. See, e.g., United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir.
2009). The passive takings analysis, by contrast, imagines that the prohibitions have been in
place for some time.
226. There are of course many potential options for developers, including greater setbacks
and different building designs. To violate the Takings Clause, the difference between the pro-
hibited activity and the second-best alternative must rise to the level of a taking. For a discus-
sion of armoring’s impact on property values, see Warren Kriesel & Robert Friedman, Coping
With Coastal Erosion: Evidence for Community-Wide Impacts, Shore & Beach, July 2003, at 19,
21 (finding that a threat of erosion reduces values by 25% and that armoring restores this
value).
227. This is an application of the Penn Central ad hoc balancing test, discussed supra text
accompanying note 17.
228. See Serkin, supra note 15, at 1251 (discussing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 175 (1979)); see also Eagle, supra note 18, at 560 (discussing same); cf. Brian Angelo Lee,
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A government may also have another defense. In some settings, sea walls
and other forms of armoring might be a nuisance, either private or public.229
Where that is true, eliminating hard armoring would then fall within the
nuisance exception to takings liability as articulated in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council.230 There, the Supreme Court held that a regulation that
would otherwise constitute a per-se taking of property would not violate the
Takings Clause if it were consistent with “background principles of nuisance
and property law.”231 Since a property owner has no right to create a nui-
sance, the law can prohibit a nuisance without effectuating a taking.232 This
has the potential to be an important defense in the particular context of
hard armoring, but it also demonstrates a crucial broader point: traditional
takings defenses are also available for passive takings claims.
Alternatively, consider the passive takings claim that might arise from
the continued presence of sea walls. Just as a prohibition on sea walls can
threaten littoral property, the presence of sea walls can threaten neighboring
property, and sea-level rise can again dramatically transform that risk. What
may have been minor erosion can become an existential threat, even though
the sea wall itself has not changed.
The most straightforward passive takings claims arise when the govern-
ment itself has constructed the hard armoring.233 This is commonplace. The
Army Corps of Engineers has armored significant stretches of the nation’s
Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
593 (2013) (defending focus on objective fair-market-value standard for valuing takings
claims).
229. See Lummis v. Lilly, 429 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Mass. 1982) (“There is no sound reason
for imposing the obligation of reasonable use on riparian owners, while permitting littoral
owners to use their property without any limitations.”); Grundy v. Thurston Cnty., 117 P.3d
1089, 1094 (Wash. 2005) (rejecting “common enemy doctrine” as applied to sea water and
allowing nuisance claim to proceed); see also Caldwell & Segall, supra note 10, at 558 (discuss-
ing nuisance).
230. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992).
231. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30.
232. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 201, at 63 (speculating that the Lucas exception
might apply to prohibitions on armoring); see also Titus, supra note 10, at 1373–74 (same).
233. It is possible to imagine a passive takings claim challenging a broad regulatory
scheme that permits hard armoring by private property owners. See, e.g., Titus, supra note 10,
at 1302 (“Currently, Maryland recognizes a statutory right to hold back the sea, and fifteen to
twenty-five miles per year have been armored over the last two decades.” (footnote omitted)).
In this case, creating an as-of-right entitlement to armor could result in private sea walls that
destroy or significantly impact neighboring property. But this more remote challenge faces an
additional conceptual hurdle, because the most obvious remedy is a private nuisance suit di-
rectly against the neighbor. How a regulatory takings claim interacts with the existence of a
private remedy is undeveloped in the law, untheorized in the literature, and raises issues that
therefore go beyond the scope of this Article.
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coastline.234 That armoring has, in a very literal sense, created conditions
that can lead to increased harm.235
As before, however, the fact of the government’s entanglement is just
the beginning of the analysis. It must also be the case that the absence of the
sea wall—in other words, its removal—would result in substantially less
erosion to neighboring property owners. A taking could occur, for example,
where the presence of the sea wall results in such substantial erosion that it
actually destroys the neighboring lot or renders it entirely unsuitable for
development.236
Importantly, however, the relevant inquiry is not what would have hap-
pened if the sea wall had never been constructed in the first place. The pre-
mise of the passive takings claim is that the original construction of the sea
wall was constitutionally permissible. Therefore, the difference between the
damage to neighboring property with the sea wall in place and the damage
with the sea wall removed must rise to the level of a taking.
Sea-level rise has the potential to reconfigure coastal property rights in
profound ways. Undoubtedly, governmental responses—or the lack
thereof—have the potential to affect both the extent and allocation of costs
associated with rising seas. Enterprising littoral owners and their attorneys
will be able to identify any number of passive takings claims arising out of
this significant ecological change. This Section has set out two of them. But
are passive takings claims in this context actually desirable?
B. Evaluating Passive Takings in the Context of Sea-Level Rise
A growing consensus exists about the range of regulatory responses that
might reduce the costs associated with sea-level rise. But there is also an
increasing awareness that many of these responses implicate property rights.
Substantial scholarly and professional attention has already been devoted to
addressing takings claims arising out of regulatory responses to sea-level
rise.237 These issues are complex and important, but all of the attention cre-
ates a different hazard: the threat of traditional takings liability may deter
234. It is difficult to find a comprehensive list of Army Corps projects armoring the coast,
but studies of individual projects are legion. See, e.g., Robert A. Morton, Interactions of Storms,
Seawalls, and Beaches of the Texas Coast, 4 J. Coastal Res. (Special Issue No. 4) 113, 115
(1988) (describing sea walls along the Texas coast).
235. See Susan Essoyan, Sand Is Vanishing Where Life’s a Beach: The Land That Defines
Hawaii Is Being Washed Away Due to Sea Walls, L.A. Times, May 23, 1996, at A5, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-05-23/news/mn-7442_1_sea-wall-application (describing
blame for erosion relating to Army Corps sea walls constructed in the 1970s).
236. Cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (announcing total wipeout rule).
237. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 11; Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity
Defenses to Takings Liability for Sea Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 J. Land Use &
Envtl. L. 395 (2011); Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 201; Thomas Ruppert, Reasonable Invest-
ment-Backed Expectations: Should Notice of Rising Seas Lead to Falling Expectations for Coastal
Property Purchasers?, 26 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 239 (2011); Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for
Making Sea-Level Rise Adaptation Tools “Takings-Proof”, 28 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 157
(2013); see also Ruhl, supra note 27, at 698.
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governments at various levels from acting at all in order to avoid the risk of
takings liability.238 A legal regime that incentivizes inaction in the face of a
potential ecological calamity is perverse indeed.
In the abstract, the best option may be to remove the threat of tradi-
tional takings liability in the context of sea-level rise. Governments could
then enact the regulations that are the most socially beneficial without facing
liability. Of course, there is no mechanism for eliminating takings liability ex
ante, absent a ruling from the Supreme Court or a constitutional amend-
ment (and, perhaps, changes to the protection of property within every sin-
gle state). And so long as any prospect of liability remains, the mere risk of
litigation can have an outsize impact on governmental decisionmaking.239
Given the persistent threat of traditional takings liability, passive takings
liability serves as a beneficial corrective for regulatory incentives. It creates
financial pressure to adopt—or maintain—the regulatory regime that will
minimize overall costs, whether or not it changes the law.240 In some specific
instances, it may well be that doing nothing is less expensive than acting in
anticipation of sea-level rise. But at least in some situations, aggressive regu-
latory action will minimize the overall costs of rising seas.
The interaction between flooding and building-height limits demon-
strates this point clearly. Relaxing height limits is by no means free. It will
allow development that clashes with current planning policy and may inter-
fere with others’ views of the ocean. But it is important to realize that retain-
ing existing height limits is also not free, and indeed the relative costs can
change over time—sometimes drastically. One response to static height lim-
its may be that property owners will choose not to build if they cannot build
consistently with sound engineering practices for floodplain development.
This outcome may frequently be appropriate from a policy perspective but
not necessarily in all cases. Some beachfront development remains extremely
valuable, even in the face of sea-level rise. If elevating structures can in fact
avoid most of the risks of flooding, then easing height limits on beachfront
property to permit such development could unlock significant value. That
238. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 11, at 97 (“Threats of takings liability will influence legis-
lative decisions.”); see also Jessica Grannis, Georgetown Climate Ctr., Zoning for Sea-
Level Rise: A Model Sea-Level Rise Ordinance and Case Study of Implementation
Barriers in Maryland 6 (2012), available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/
default/files/Zoning%20for%20Sea-Level%20Rise%20Executive%20Summary%20Final.pdf
(“The primary concern that most local governments have when enacting new regulations is
that they will be sued for violating constitutional protections of property rights.”).
239. See Serkin, supra note 62, at 1637 (arguing that local governments are likely to be risk
averse when it comes to takings liability).
240. See Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to
Climate Change Adaptation, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 269, 290–91 (2012) (exploring distributive conse-
quences of leaving outdated laws and regulations in place in the face of sea-level rise). See
generally Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local Government Liability
for Failure to Adapt to Climate Change, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 775 (2013) (arguing for a tort-
based duty on municipalities to respond to climate change).
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value might exceed the value of the height limits to the public. Passive tak-
ings liability provides a mechanism for ensuring that the government con-
siders those costs as well.
Beachfront property owners often have a more troubling alternative:
continue to build without elevating the structures, despite the risk of flood-
ing.241 Adopting this alternative is not as unlikely a decision as it might seem
because, if a flood occurs, property owners will not internalize the full costs
of flood damage. The National Flood Insurance Program, coupled with the
almost inevitable infusion of public money following a significant flood,
means that property owners can expect to be protected from at least some of
the risks of sea-level rise.242 And a decision to build anyway may impose
substantial costs on everyone. Buildings that are not elevated can function as
miniature sea walls in a flood and thereby increase the damage to surround-
ing property.243 If the building itself is destroyed, the resulting debris can
also damage remaining structures and increase cleanup costs.244 Of course, if
the government expects to be obligated to pay those cleanup costs, it may
have an incentive to adopt sensible regulations ex ante, even in the absence
of passive takings liability. But there are likely to be intergovernmental exter-
nalities as well. Zoning decisions are primarily local, and cleanup costs are
likely to be borne primarily by states and the federal government.
Passive takings would encourage the government to adopt a regulatory
strategy that will minimize overall costs. Sometimes that may mean leaving
241. This may not be possible where FEMA has updated its NFIP maps, pursuant to the
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100216, 126 Stat.
916, 927–30 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101b (2012)) (authorizing continuing studies of flood
hazards in order to provide for a constant reappraisal of the flood insurance program). But
that change threatens traditional “active” takings liability. The availability of passive takings
liability in areas where the maps have not been updated to reflect the new reality of rising seas
simply adds a measure of symmetry. For a discussion of the NFIP, see supra note 214.
242. See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the
Police Power, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 201, 210–11 (1974) (“[F]loodplain occupants can expect massive
federal, state, and local efforts to rescue them and their property . . . . To be sure, each individ-
ual owner risks injury, disease, or death, and his property may be soaked, crushed, buried in
mud, or floated away. When he weighs the dangers and odds of developing on the floodplain
against its various attractions, however, the individual can discount many of his own potential
costs thanks to insurance or relief, and he can completely ignore almost all damages imposed
upon the public at large.” (footnote omitted)); Matthew P. Weaver, Comment, Fear and Loath-
ing in Post-Katrina Emergency Debris Management: According to Whom, Pursuant to What, and
You Want to Dump That Where?, 20 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 429, 434–37 (2007).
243. See, e.g., Anne Siders, Managed Coastal Retreat: A Legal Handbook on Shift-
ing Development Away from Vulnerable Areas 95 (2013), available at https://web.law.col
umbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/ManagedCoastalRe
treat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf (citing Mississippi flooding ordinance); Plater, supra note 242, at
211–12 (“Physical obstructions of the floodway can severely interfere with local flow charac-
teristics by catching debris and causing upstream ponding, deflections, and scouring.”).
244. See, e.g., Robert Esworthy et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 33115, Cleanup
After Hurricane Katrina: Environmental Considerations 7 (2006) (“Disaster debris is
a highly visible reminder of the scope of a disaster, and debris management accounts for as
much as 40% of all disaster-related costs.”).
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the height limits in place, sometimes it will mean relaxing the limits to per-
mit elevated buildings, and other times it may mean enacting an outright
ban on new development instead of relying on the somewhat ad hoc effects
of zoning. The availability of passive takings will not predetermine either the
imposition of liability or the government’s response to liability. But it does
add to the calculation a beneficial symmetry between governmental action
and inaction.
A pervasive distributional worry lurks behind this analysis, however.
Forcing the government to pay when zoning height limits interact with sea-
level rise can effectuate an unappealing transfer of wealth from taxpayers to
a small group of beachfront property owners who are probably already well-
to-do.245 This is a regressive compensation regime. A more just allocation of
burdens and benefits would let the costs of sea-level rise fall on the people
who have chosen to—and who can afford to—live directly on the coast.246
The concern can be generalized. The motivation for recognizing passive
takings liability is that, when confronted with the costs of inaction, the gov-
ernment will be more likely to act in ways that minimize the overall costs
from ecological changes. But there is another possible outcome: the govern-
ment will continue doing nothing but will also have to pay compensation to
discrete groups of property owners sophisticated enough to pursue their
claims. The government will then have even less money to address regula-
tory challenges after paying off the people affected by inaction. Worse still,
the compensated property owners may not be appealing beneficiaries of this
compensation regime, either because they are likely to be adequately pro-
tected in the political process or because they were initially better positioned
to avoid the costs of ecological change.247
That is certainly a real concern. But of course, traditional takings liabil-
ity has exactly the same effect when governments affirmatively regulate to
deal with the risk of climate change. Takings liability for rolling easements or
other mechanisms for coastal retreat also amounts to a wealth transfer from
the public to beachfront property owners. While that reality may well be a
policy reason not to offer compensation for regulatory responses to sea-level
rise, the Takings Clause nevertheless sometimes compels it. And the point
here is simply that no reason exists to treat inaction any differently.
Furthermore, not responding to the risk of sea-level rise is also likely to
effectuate wealth transfers, but it will simply do so in a more haphazard way.
If the risk of traditional takings liability discourages governments from act-
ing at all, then the costs of sea-level rise are likely to be greater in absolute
terms and are also likely to be distributed unfairly. Sea-level rise will create
relative winners and losers, and no one should pretend that the distribution
245. Of course, not all coastal property owners are well-to-do. Historically, coastal prop-
erty was less desirable, and in many cities vulnerable populations remain housed on the water.
246. For an argument that the Takings Clause should reflect progressive values and the
mechanics of such an interpretation, see Dagan, supra note 79.
247. For more on the resulting moral-hazard problem, see supra Section III.C.2.
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of benefits and burdens resulting from inaction will be any fairer.248 Already,
there are myriad examples of inaction burdening the most vulnerable mem-
bers of society.249
C. Other Contexts for Passive Takings
Once the dynamic at play in passive takings has been identified, it is easy
to recognize in other regulatory contexts as well. The purpose in this Section
is not to provide a comprehensive treatment of these other claims but in-
stead to suggest the form that they might take in order to demonstrate the
potential breadth of passive takings claims. Each particular claim faces com-
plicated problems of proof and is animated by different normative intu-
itions. Nevertheless, passive takings may arise in many different situations.
Consider, first, intellectual property protection and copyright law in
particular. Congress has provided relatively comprehensive protection for
fixed works that reflects a general balancing of creators’ right to control their
works and the public’s ultimate interest in gaining access to those works.250
While the statutory regime is hardly static, the form of that compromise has
proven remarkably enduring. Creators are given a set amount of time to
control their works, subject to exceptions like fair use and satire and subject
also to judicially created exceptions.251 Taken together, the time limits and
exceptions to copyright protection ensure that creators have the opportunity
to benefit from their works while providing the public with access to the
works (although on limited terms and only after a significant period of
time).
As technology speeds ahead, however, copyright law feels increasingly
antiquated. The capacity to create and distribute digital copies has made it
much more difficult, if not impossible, for creators to preserve their exclu-
sive rights to their works. At the same time, rules that treat loading data into
RAM as copies under the Copyright Act dramatically limit purchasers’ tradi-
tional rights to consume or transfer works in digital formats.252 The result is
a largely inadvertent recalibration of the rights of creators and the rights of
the public in a system that seems almost anachronistic.
248. E.g., Jeremy Martinich et al., Risks of Sea Level Rise to Disadvantaged Communities in
the United States, 18 Mitigation & Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 169, 182
(2013) (“The results of this analysis indicate that many socially disadvantaged Americans liv-
ing in coastal areas are very likely to be disproportionately affected by [sea-level rise].”); cf. J.B.
Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 206 (2012).
249. See, e.g., Talk of the Nation: Sandy Especially Tough on Vulnerable Populations, Nat’l
Pub. Radio (Nov. 1, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/11/01/164113455/sandy-espe
cially-tough-on-vulnerable-populations (describing burdens of Hurricane Sandy).
250. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 1031 (2005).
251. One exception, for example, is time-shifting television broadcasts that allow people
to record shows and watch them later. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 421 (1984) (recognizing time shifting).
252. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of
Copy Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1256 (2001).
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In the face of legal inadequacy, creators and their intermediaries have
turned to technological and contractual responses to retain control over
works.253 And users have adopted increasingly sophisticated forms of copy-
ing—for example, piracy—to skirt those limits. Congress has intervened but
only in limited and controversial ways.254 It is possible, however, to imagine
that the Takings Clause might require Congress to act. In this quickly chang-
ing world, the relatively stable legal regime may result in a fundamental
reconfiguration of rights in ways that might generate passive takings claims.
Consider the elements of a passive takings claim in turn.
When it comes to copyright, the government is unquestionably com-
plicit in creating the conditions that now threaten property rights. The Cop-
yright Act all but occupies the field, and through it Congress has defined
both the reach and limits of protection for creative works.255 If Congress
were (improbably) to reduce or eliminate copyright protection for some
works, such a move could trigger a takings claim, depending on the nature
and extent of the impact on existing rights.256 Under the reasoning of passive
takings, there is no reason the government should be immune from liability
for a similar impact on existing rights resulting instead from a change in the
world.
Failure to adjust copyright does not necessarily constitute a taking, how-
ever. The creators—or the public, depending on the claim being pursued—
would still have to demonstrate that a permissible governmental response
exists that would actually protect their rights and that the difference between
that regulatory regime and the current state of affairs rises to the level of a
taking. This is no easy feat. For example, current forms of piracy may have
become so complex and sophisticated that no regulatory regime is likely to
stop the practice. In the absence of a meaningful and impactful regulatory
response, there would be no passive taking. But creative lawyers—or subse-
quent scholarly work—may be able to identify relevant comparators that
could make such claims successful.
A similar analysis applies to financial regulations. The two best examples
include both a counterfactual historical example and a contemporary one.
For the first—and more intuitive—example, consider the history of
Regulation Q.257 Adopted in the 1930s, Regulation Q limited the amount of
253. I thank Daniel Gervaise for formulating the problem in these terms.
254. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112
Stat. 2860, 2863–76 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2012)).
255. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An
“Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 747–49 (2006).
256. Cf. Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 567,
627 (2006); John C. O’Quinn, Protecting Private Intellectual Property from Government Intru-
sion: Revisiting Smithkline and the Case for Just Compensation, 29 Pepp. L. Rev. 435, 530
(2002).
257. See Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (2011).
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interest that banks were allowed to pay on demand deposits.258 This limit
protected banks from competition in the interest rates they were paying and
effectively guaranteed them profits on the interest-rate spread that existed
for decades.259 That model came under serious pressure, however, when the
interest-rate environment changed. With the emergence of new forms of
savings accounts, banks lost the ability to compete for depositors, threaten-
ing the traditional banking sector.260 In response, Congress began to phase
out interest-rate caps and make other savings products available to banks.261
Suppose, however, that Congress had not amended Regulation Q. Suddenly,
a regulation that had helped banks for decades might have ruined their busi-
ness. After all, traditional banking relies on the spread between the interest
rates of assets and liabilities; with liabilities capped at below-market rates,
there would have been no money to be made. This result might have given
rise to a passive takings claim.
For a current, if less accessible, example, consider recent regulatory
moves that require derivatives to be traded through financial clearing-
houses.262 Promoted for the safety and security of the financial system, the
regulations put clearinghouses at some risk. But that change, by itself, does
not rise to the level of a taking, and indeed the regulations have not yet—
and may never—impose a substantial burden. But they might. In fact, Pro-
fessor Yadav recently warned that derivatives and other hard-to-value securi-
ties expose clearinghouses to massive and even devastating losses without
providing any real regulatory protection.263 Clearinghouses are actually the
counterparty for each trade, and they are therefore exposed to significant, if
generally underappreciated, risks when the trades involve risks in the under-
lying assets.264 Should those risks materialize, they could threaten either the
system of clearinghouses or derivative markets more generally (or both).
While initially benign, and perhaps even beneficial, these regulations might
eventually result in a taking if there are adverse changes in the financial
markets.
258. For a discussion, see, for example, R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What
It Did and Why It Passed Away, Fed. Res. Bank St. Louis Rev., Feb. 1986, at 28 (describing
the history of Regulation Q). Thanks to Morgan Ricks for suggesting this example.
259. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C.
Banking Inst. 221, 238 (2000) (“Because of Regulation Q, banking was not viewed to be a
very complicated business in the 1950s. It was claimed that bankers operated on a ‘3-6-3’ rule.
This meant that the bankers borrowed money at the Regulation Q interest rate of three percent
and loaned the money at six percent. The bankers were then free to play golf by three o’clock,
since there was nothing else to do.”).
260. See id. at 240–44.
261. Id. at 245 n.148.
262. Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 Geo.
L.J. 387, 389 n.2 (2013).
263. Id. at 432 (“[C]onfidence in the clearinghouse’s ability correctly to determine the
amount of collateral it needs assumes that the clearinghouse can correctly understand the risks
it faces and, furthermore, is able to internalize its costs. These assumptions rest on shaky
ground.”).
264. See id. at 391–93.
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Other claims are also easy to imagine. The federal government’s com-
plicity in the mortgage markets—with its role in supporting Fannie Mae
and Freddy Mac, its comprehensive regulation of federally chartered banks,
and its general policies promoting homeownership—might also expose it to
passive takings liability for failing to deal adequately with the foreclosure
crisis.265 The government’s failure to regulate dangerous chemicals, modern-
ize aviation regulation and oversight, or streamline the patent process may
all have similar implications.
Again, none of these examples necessarily constitutes a taking. In fact,
most probably do not. But Congress and other governmental actors and
agencies should not be able to avoid takings liability by relying on artificial
distinctions between acts and omissions. If the government’s dramatic inter-
ventions into financial markets and other areas can trigger takings claims—
and they can266—then some failures to intervene should as well.
Conclusion
Courts and scholars have long believed that the Takings Clause is impli-
cated only in moments of legal transition. A theory of passive takings—
takings that result from legal stability but ecological change—demonstrates
that legal change is not necessary to create takings liability. But more than
that, passive takings demonstrate that, where property rights are at stake, the
Takings Clause may compel the government to protect private property.
When the government is sufficiently entangled with the substantive content
of property rights, it may be obligated to act. The state’s failure to modify its
regulatory scheme in the face of harmful ecological change can therefore
trigger passive takings liability. Not only is this claim doctrinally plausible
but it is normatively desirable. Passive takings can provide an important
counterbalance to the threat of traditional takings liability, one that actually
encourages efficient decisionmaking and promotes the just distribution of
regulatory burdens and benefits.
Sea-level rise provides a compelling example, but now that the category
of passive takings has been identified, enterprising scholars and attorneys
will no doubt find other places to push the doctrine. Making the govern-
ment liable for those burdens—at least where all the conditions for passive
takings have been satisfied—will encourage the government to act and
therefore will create an important counterweight to regulatory intransi-
gence. Property rights—long seen as a bulwark against redistribution and
state action—may ultimately provide the strongest doctrinal and normative
support for compelling governmental action.
265. See, e.g., David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing
Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 907 (2010).
266. See David Voreacos, Greenberg’s AIG Bailout Suits Pursue Unique Theories, Bloom-
berg (Dec. 1, 2011, 7:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-01/greenberg-s-auda
cious-aig-bailout-suits-pursue-unique-theories.html.
